कानपुर के नए एडी बेसिक बने उमेश शुक्ला

ब्रेकिंग न्यूज

ललितपुर । प्रदेश के लोकप्रिय ,विकास पुरुष माननीय मुख्यमंत्री अखिलेश यादव 15 नवम्बर को आ सकते हैं जनपद दौरे पर , विकासखण्ड विरधा के ग्राम कुचदों , सेपुरा में लगायेगें चौपाल ,बांटेगें गरीबो को लोहिया आवास ।

महिला अनुदेशक भी मातृत्व अवकाश की हकदार: हाईकोर्ट

महिला अनुदेशक भी मातृत्व अवकाश की हकदार: हाईकोर्ट
: संविदा के पद पर कार्यरत बेसिक शिक्षा विभाग के महिला अनुदेशकों को भी मातृत्व अवकाश पाने का हक है। उन्हें इससे वंचित नहीं किया जा सकता। इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की ओर से तय गाइडलाइन के आधार यह व्यवस्था दी है।
इसके साथ ही अदालत ने आदेश दिया है कि याची के प्रत्यावेदन पर इस आदेश के परिप्रेक्ष्य में निर्णय लिया जाए। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति एसएन शुक्ला ने बांदा की प्राची पांडेय की याचिका पर दिया है। याची का कहना था कि उसे मातृत्व अवकाश पाने का अधिकार है। उसने बीएसए बांदा को इसके लिए प्रत्यावेदन दिया था लेकिन इस पर निर्णय नहीं लिया गया। कोर्ट ने कहा कि महिला कर्मियों से कार्यस्थल पर भेदभाव न होने संबंधी अंतरराष्ट्रीय संधि पर भारत ने हस्ताक्षर किए हैं और सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने म्युनिसिपल कॉरपोरेशन ऑफ दिल्ली बनाम महिला कर्मी के मामले में गाइड लाइन तय की है। कोर्ट ने जिला बेसिक शिक्षा अधिकारी को प्रत्यावेदन जल्द निर्णीत करने का आदेश दिया है।

दिल्ली सरकार के बाद बिहार सरकार ने जारी किया समान काम सामान वेतन का आदेश

दिल्ली सरकार के बाद बिहार सरकार ने जारी किया समान काम सामान वेतन का आदेश

सामान कार्य सामान वेतन की सुप्रीमकोर्ट की कॉपी

“REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 213 OF 2013
State of Punjab & Ors. … Appellants
Versus
Jagjit Singh & Ors. … Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10356 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL).31676 CC NO. 15616 OF 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 236 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10357 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) 31677 CC NO. 16434 OF 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 245 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10358 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 37162 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 246 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10360 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 37164 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 247 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10361 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 37165 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 248 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 211 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 212 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 257 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 214 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 260 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 217 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 262 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 966 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 219 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2231 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 220 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2299 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 221 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2300 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 222 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2301 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 223 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2702 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 224 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7150 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 225 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8248 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 226 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8979 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9295 OF 2013
2
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 228 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10362 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 9464 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 229 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10363 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 11966 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 230 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10364 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 17707 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 231 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10365 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 24410 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 232 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 871 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 233 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10366 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO. 4340 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 234 OF 2013 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10527 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 235 OF 2013
J U D G M E N T
Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.1. Delay in filing and refiling Special Leave Petition (Civil)…. CC no. 15616 of2011, and Special Leave Petition (Civil)…. CC no. 16434 of 2011 is condoned.Leave is granted in all special leave petitions.2. A division bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in State of Punjab& Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (LPA no. 337 of 2003, decided on 7.1.2009), setaside, in an intra-court appeal, the judgment rendered by a learned single Judgeof the High Court, in Rajinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no.1536 of 1988, decided on 5.2.2003). In the above judgment, the learned singleJudge had directed the State to pay to the writ petitioners (who were dailywagers working as Pump Operators, Fitters, Helpers, Drivers, Plumbers,Chowkidars etc.), minimum of the pay-scale, revised from time to time, withpermissible allowances, as were being paid to similarly placed regular
3employees; arrears payable, were limited to a period of three years, prior to thedate of filing of the writ petition. In sum and substance, the above mentioneddivision bench held, that temporary employees were not entitled to the minimumof the pay-scale, as was being paid to similarly placed regular employees.3. Another division bench of the same High Court, in State of Punjab & Ors.v. Rajinder Kumar (LPA no. 1024 of 2009, decided on 30.8.2010), dismissed anintra-Court appeal preferred by the State of Punjab, arising out of the judgmentrendered by a learned single Judge in Rajinder Kumar v. State of Punjab & Ors.(CWP no. 14050 of 1999, decided on 20.11.2002), and affirmed the decision ofthe single Judge, in connected appeals preferred by employees. The letterspatent bench held, that the writ petitioners (working as daily-wage PumpOperators, Fitters, Helpers, Drivers, Plumbers, Chowkidars, Ledger Clerks,Ledger Keepers, Petrol Men, Surveyors, Fitter Coolies, Sewermen, and the like),were entitled to minimum of the pay-scale, alongwith permissible allowances (asrevised from time to time), which were being given to similarly placed regularemployees. Arrears payable to the concerned employees were limited to threeyears prior to the filing of the writ petition. In sum and substance, the divisionbench in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar (LPA no. 1024 of 2009)affirmed the position adopted by the learned single Judge in Rajinder Singh &Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no. 1536 of 1988). It is apparent, that theinstant division bench, concluded conversely as against the judgment rendered inState of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh (LPA no. 337 of 2003), by the earlierdivision bench.
44. It would be relevant to mention, that the earlier judgment rendered, in Stateof Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (LPA no. 337 of 2003) was not noticedby the later division bench – in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar (LPAno. 1024 of 2009). Noticing a conflict of views expressed in the judgmentsrendered by two division benches in the above matters, a learned single Judge ofthe High Court, referred the matter for adjudication to a larger bench, on11.5.2011. It is, therefore, that a full bench of the High Court, took up the issue,for resolving the dispute emerging out of the differences of opinion expressed inthe above two judgments, in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no.14796 of 2003), alongwith connected writ petitions. The full bench rendered itsjudgment on 11.11.2011. The present bunch of cases, which we have taken upfor collective disposal, comprise of a challenge to the judgment rendered by thedivision bench of the High Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh &Ors. (LPA no. 337 of 2003, decided on 7.1.2009); a challenge to the judgment,referred to above, in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar (LPA no. 1024 of2009, decided on 30.8.2010); as also, a challenge to the judgment rendered bythe full bench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWPno. 14796 of 2003, decided on 11.11.2011). This bunch of cases, also involveschallenges to judgments rendered by the High Court, by relying on the judgmentsreferred to above.5. The issue which arises for our consideration is, whether temporarilyengaged employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employeesappointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), are entitled to
5minimum of the regular pay-scale, alongwith dearness allowance (as revisedfrom time to time) on account of their performing the same duties, which aredischarged by those engaged on regular basis, against sanctioned posts. Thefull bench of the High Court, while adjudicating upon the above controversy hadconcluded, that such like temporary employees were not entitled to the minimumof the regular pay-scale, merely for reason, that the activities carried on by dailywagers and the regular employees were similar. However, it carved out twoexceptions, and extended the minimum of the regular pay to such employees.The exceptions recorded by the full bench of the High Court in the impugnedjudgment are extracted hereunder:-“(1) A daily wager, ad hoc or contractual appointee against the regularsanctioned posts, if appointed after undergoing a selection process basedupon fairness and equality of opportunity to all other eligible candidates,shall be entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale from the date ofengagement.(2) But if daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees are notappointed against regular sanctioned posts and their services are availedcontinuously, with notional breaks, by the State Government or itsinstrumentalities for a sufficient long period i.e. for 10 years, such dailywagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees shall be entitled to minimum ofthe regular pay scale without any allowances on the assumption that workof perennial nature is available and having worked for such long period oftime, an equitable right is created in such category of persons. Their claimfor regularization, if any, may have to be considered separately in terms oflegally permissible scheme.(3) In the event, a claim is made for minimum pay scale after more thanthree years and two months of completion of 10 years of continuousworking, a daily wager, ad hoc or contractual employee shall be entitled toarrears for a period of three years and two months.”6. The issue which has arisen for consideration in the present set of appeals,necessitates a bird’s eye view on the legal position declared by this Court, on theunderlying ingredients, which govern the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
6It is also necessary for resolving the controversy, to determine the manner inwhich this Court has extended the benefit of “minimum of the regular pay-scale”alongwith dearness allowance, as revised from time to time, to temporaryemployees (engaged on daily-wage basis, as ad-hoc appointees, as employeesengaged on casual basis, as contract appointees, and the like). For theaforesaid purpose, we shall, examine the above issue, in two stages. We shallfirst examine situations where the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has beenextended to employees engaged on regular basis. And thereafter, how the samehas been applied with reference to different categories of temporary employees.7. Randhir Singh v. Union of India1, decided by a three-Judge bench: Thepetitioner in the instant case, was holding the post of Driver-Constable in theDelhi Police Force, under the Delhi Administration. The scale of pay of DriverConstables, in case of non-matriculates was Rs.210-270, and in case ofmatriculates was Rs.225-308. The scale of pay of Drivers in the RailwayProtection Force, at that juncture was Rs.260-400. The pay-scale of Drivers inthe non-secretariat offices in Delhi was, Rs.260-350. And that, of Driversemployed in secretariat offices in Delhi, was Rs.260-400. The pay-scale ofDrivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade Department, and in the Departmentof Lighthouse was Rs.330-480. The prayer of the petitioner was, that he shouldbe placed in the scale of pay, as was extended to Drivers in other governmentalorganizations in Delhi. The instant prayer was based on the submission, that he
1
(1982) 1 SCC 618
7was discharging the same duties as other Drivers. His contention was, that theduties of Drivers engaged by the Delhi Police Force, were more onerous thanDrivers in other departments. He based his claim on the logic, that there was noreason/justification, to assign different pay-scales to Drivers, engaged in differentdepartments of the Delhi Administration.(ii) This Court on examining the above controversy, arrived at the conclusion,that merely the fact that the concerned employees were engaged in differentdepartments of the Government, was not by itself sufficient to justify differentpay-scales. It was acknowledged, that though persons holding the samerank/designation in different departments of the Government, may be dischargingdifferent duties. Yet it was held, that if their powers, duties and responsibilitieswere identical, there was no justification for extending different scales of pay tothem, merely because they were engaged in different departments. Accordinglyit was declared, that where all relevant considerations were the same, personsholding identical posts ought not to be treated differently, in the matter of pay. Ifthe officers in the same rank perform dissimilar functions and exercise differentpowers, duties and responsibilities, such officers could not complain, that theyhad been placed in a dissimilar pay-scale (even though the nomenclature anddesignation of the posts, was the same). It was concluded, that the principle of‘equal pay for equal work’, which meant equal pay for everyone irrespective ofsex, was deducible from the Preamble and Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of theConstitution. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, was held to beapplicable to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or
8irrational classification, though both sets of employees (- engaged on temporaryand regular basis, respectively) performed identical duties and responsibilities.(iii) The Court arrived at the conclusion, that there could not be the slightestdoubt that Driver-Constables engaged in the Delhi Police Force, performed thesame functions and duties, as other Drivers in the services of the DelhiAdministration and the Central Government. Even though he belonged to adifferent department, the petitioner was held as entitled to the pay-scale ofRs.260-400.8. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India2, decided by a five-Judge ConstitutionBench: It is not necessary for us to narrate the factual controversy adjudicatedupon in this case. In fact, the main issue which arose for consideration pertainedto pension, and not to wages. Be that as it may, it is of utmost importance tohighlight the following observations recorded in the above judgment:-“32. Having succinctly focused our attention on the conspectus ofelements and incidents of pension the main question may now be tackled.But, the approach of court while considering such measure is of paramountimportance. Since the advent of the Constitution, the State action must bedirected towards attaining the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitutionwhich, when achieved, would permit us to claim that we have set up awelfare State. Article 38 (1) enjoins the State to strive to promote welfareof the people by securing and protecting as effective as it may a socialorder in which justice - social, economic and political shall inform allinstitutions of the national life. In particular the State shall strive tominimise the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalitiesin status, facilities and opportunities. Art. 39 (d) enjoins a duty to see thatthere is equal pay for equal work for both men and women and thisdirective should be understood and interpreted in the light of the judgmentof this Court in Randhir Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 618.
2 (1983) 1 SCC 304
9Revealing the scope and content of this facet of equality, ChinnappaReddy, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: (SCC p.619, para 1)"Now, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and theexpectations aroused as a consequence and the forward lookingposture of this Court, the under-privileged also are clamouring forthe rights and are seeking the intervention of the court with touchingfaith and confidence in the court. The Judges of the court have aduty to redeem their Constitutional oath and do justice no less to thepavement dweller than to the guest of the five-star hotel."Proceeding further, this Court observed that where all relevantconsiderations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not betreated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong todifferent departments. If that can't be done when they are in service, canthat be done during their retirement? Expanding this principle, one canconfidently say that if pensioners form a class, their computation cannot beby different formula affording unequal treatment solely on the ground thatsome retired earlier and some retired later. Art. 39 (e) requires the State tosecure that the health and strength of workers, men and women, andchildren of tender age are not abused and that citizens are not forced byeconomic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age orstrength. Art. 41 obligates the State within the limits of its economiccapacity and development, to make effective provision for securing theright to work, to education and to provide assistance in cases ofunemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases ofundeserved want. Art. 43 (3) requires the State to endeavour to secureamongst other things full enjoyment of leisure and social and culturalopportunities.”It is however impossible to overlook, that the Constitution Bench noticed theRandhir Singh case1, and while affirming the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’, extended it to pensionary entitlements also.9. Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers(Recognized) v. Union of India3, decided by a two-Judge bench: The petitionersin the above case, were Personal Assistants and Stenographers attached toheads of departments in the Customs and Central Excise Department, of the
3 (1988) 3 SCC 91
10Ministry of Finance. They were placed in the pay-scale of Rs.550-900. Thepetitioners claimed, that the basic qualifications, the method, manner and sourceof recruitment, and their grades of promotion were the same as some of theircounterparts (Personal Assistants and Stenographers) attached to JointSecretaries/Secretaries and other officers in the Central Secretariat. The abovecounterparts, it was alleged, were placed in the pay-scale of Rs.650-1040. Thepetitioners’ contention was, that their duties and responsibilities were similar tothe duties and responsibilities discharged by some of their counterparts.Premised on the instant foundation, it was their contention, that the differentiationin their pay-scales, was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.The petitioners claimed ‘equal pay for equal work’.(ii) The assertions made by the petitioners were repudiated by the Union ofIndia. Whilst acknowledging, that the duties and work performed by thepetitioners were/was identical to that performed by their counterparts attached toJoint Secretaries/Secretaries and other officers in the secretariat, yet it waspointed out, that their counterparts working in the secretariat, constituted a class,which was distinguishable from them. It was asserted, that the abovecounterparts discharged duties of higher responsibility, as Joint Secretaries andDirectors in the Central Secretariat performed functions and duties of greaterresponsibility, as compared to heads of departments, with whom the petitionerswere attached. It was contended, that the principle of ’equal pay for equal work’depended on the nature of the work done, and not on the mere volume and kindof work. The respondents also asserted, that people discharging duties and
11responsibilities which were qualitatively different, when examined on thetouchstone of reliability and responsibility, could not be placed in the same payscale.(iii) While adjudicating upon the controversy, this Court arrived at theconclusion, that the differentiation of the pay-scale was not sought to be justifiedon the basis of the functional work discharged by the petitioners and theircounterparts in the secretariat, but on the dissimilarity of their responsibility,confidentiality and the relationship with the public etc. It was accordinglyconcluded, that the same amount of physical work, could entail different quality ofwork, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less. It wastherefore held, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ could not betranslated into a mathematical formula. Interference in a claim as the oneprojected by the petitioners at the hands of a Court, would not be possible unlessit could be demonstrated, that either the differentiation in the pay-scale wasirrational, or based on no basis, or arrived at mala fide, either in law or on fact. Inthe light of the stance adopted by the respondents, it was held that it was notpossible to say, that the differentiation of pay in the present controversy, was notbased on a rational nexus. In the above view of the matter, the prayer made bythe petitioners was declined.10. State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia4, decided by a two-Judge bench: Prior to1965, Bench Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad, were placed in a pay-
4 (1989) 1 SCC 121
12scale higher than that allowed to Section Officers. Bench Secretaries wereplaced in the pay-scale of Rs.160-320 as against the pay-scale of Rs.100-300extended to Section Officers. A Rationalization Committee, recommended thepay-scale of Rs.150-350 for Bench Secretaries and Rs.200-400 for SectionOfficers. While examining the recommendation, the State Government placedBench Secretaries in the pay-scale of Rs.200-400, and Section Officers in thepay-scale of Rs.515-715. Dissatisfied with the apparent down-grading, BenchSecretaries demanded, that they should be placed at par with Section Officers,even though their principal prayer was for being placed in a higher pay-scale.The matter was examined by the Pay Commission, which also submitted itsreport. The Pay Commission refused to accept, that Bench Secretaries andSection Officers could be equated, for the purpose of pay-scales. The PayCommission was of the view, that the nature of work of Section Officers was notonly different, but also, more onerous than that of Bench Secretaries. It alsoexpressed the view, that Section Officers had to bear more responsibilities intheir sections, and were required to exercise control over their subordinates.Additionally, they were required to prepare lengthy original notes, in complicatedmatters. The Pay Commission therefore recommended, the pay-scale ofRs.400-750 for Bench Secretaries and Rs.500-1000 for Section Officers.Thereupon, the Anomalies Committee, while rejecting the claim of BenchSecretaries for being placed on par with Section Officers, suggested that 10posts of Bench Secretaries should be upgraded and placed in the pay-scale ofRs.500-1000 (the same as, Section Officers). Those Bench Secretaries, who
13were placed in the pay-scale of Rs.500-1000 were designated as BenchSecretaries Grade-I, and those placed in the pay-scale of Rs.400-750, weredesignated as Bench Secretaries Grade-II.(ii) This Court while adjudicating upon the controversy, examined the matterfrom two different angles. Firstly, whether Bench Secretaries in the High Court ofAllahabad, were entitled to the pay-scale admissible to Section Officers?Secondly, whether the creation of two grades with different pay-scales in thecadre of Bench Secretaries despite the fact that they were discharging the sameduties and responsibilities, was violative of the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’?(iii) While answering the first question this Court felt, that the issue requiredevaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts, with whichequation was sought. And it was concluded, that on the subject of equation ofposts, the matter ought to be left for determination to the executive, as the samewould have to be examined by expert bodies. It was however held, thatwhenever it was felt, that expert bodies had not evaluated the duties andresponsibilities in consonance with law, the matter would be open to judicialreview. In the present case, while acknowledging that at one time BenchSecretaries were paid more emoluments than Section Officers, it was held, thatsince successive Pay Commissions and even Pay Rationalization Committeeshad found, that Section Officers performed more onerous duties, bearing greaterresponsibility as compared to Bench Secretaries, it was not possible for thisCourt to go against the said opinion. As such, this Court rejected the prayer of
14the Bench Secretaries as of right, to be assigned a pay-scale equivalent to orhigher than that of Section Officers.(iv) With reference to the second question, namely, whether there could be twoscales of pay in the same cadre, of persons performing the same or similar workor duties, this Court expressed the view, that all Bench Secretaries in the HighCourt of Allahabad performed the same duties, but Bench Secretaries Grade-Iwere entitled to a higher pay-scale than Bench Secretaries Grade-II, on accountof their selection as Bench Secretaries Grade-I, out of Bench Secretaries GradeII, by a Selection Committee appointed under the rules, framed by the HighCourt. The above selection, was based on merit with due regard to seniority.And only such Bench Secretaries Grade-II who had acquired sufficientexperience, and also displayed a higher level of merit, could be appointed asBench Secretaries Grade-I. It was therefore held, that the rules provided for aproper classification, for the grant of higher emoluments to Bench SecretariesGrade-I, as against Bench Secretaries Grade-II.(v) In the above view of the matter, the claim raised by the Bench Secretariesfor equal pay, as was extended to Section Officers, was declined by this Court.11. Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences5, decided by atwo-Judge bench: The petitioner in this case, was appointed against the post ofHearing Therapist, at the AIIMS, with effect from 3.8.1972. At that juncture, hewas placed in the pay-scale of Rs.210-425. Based on the recommendations
5 (1989) 2 SCC 235
15made by the Third Pay Commission (which were adopted by the AIIMS), the payscale for the post of Hearing Therapist was revised to Rs.425-700, with effectfrom 1.1.1973. The petitioner accordingly came to be paid emoluments in theaforesaid revised pay-scale. The petitioner asserted, that the post of HearingTherapist was required to discharge duties and responsibilities which weresimilar to those of the posts of Speech Pathologist and Audiologist. The saidposts were in the pay-scale of Rs.650-1200. Since the claim of the petitioner forthe aforesaid higher pay-scale (made under the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’) was not acceded to by the department, he made a representation to theThird Pay Commission, which also negatived his claim for parity, as also, for ahigher pay-scale. It is therefore that he sought judicial intervention. His maingrievance was, that Hearing Therapist performed similar duties and functions asthe posts of Senior Speech Pathologist, Senior Physiotherapist, SeniorOccupational Therapist, Audiologist, and Speech Pathologist, and further, thequalifications prescribed for the above said posts were almost similar. Sincethose holding the above mentioned comparable posts were also working in theAIIMS, it was asserted, that the action of the employer was discriminatorytowards the petitioner.(ii) Whilst controverting the claim of the petitioner it was pointed out, that thepost of Hearing Therapist was not comparable with the posts referred to by thepetitioner. It was contended, that neither the qualifications nor the duties andfunctions of the posts referred to by the petitioner, were similar to that of HearingTherapist. In the absence of equality between the post of Hearing Therapist, and
16the other posts referred to by the petitioner, it was asserted, that the claim of thepetitioner was not acceptable under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.(iii) During the course of hearing, the petitioner confined his claim for parityonly with the post of Audiologist. It was urged, that educational qualifications, aswell as, duties and functions of the posts of Hearing Therapist and Audiologistwere similar (if not the same). It was contended, that a Hearing Therapist wasrequired to treat the deaf and other patients suffering from hearing defects. AHearing Therapist is required to help in the rehabilitation of persons with hearingimpairments. It was also pointed out, that an Audiologist’s work was tocoordinate the separate professional skills, which contribute to the study,treatment and rehabilitation of persons with impaired hearing. As such it wassubmitted, that a person holding the post of an Audiologist, was a specialist inthe non-medical evaluation, habilitation and rehabilitation, of those who havelanguage and speech disorders. On the aforesaid premise, the petitionerclaimed parity with the pay-scale of Audiologists.(iv) This Court held, that there was a qualitative difference between the twoposts, on the basis of educational qualifications, and therefore, the principle of‘equal pay for equal work’, could not be invoked or applied. It was further held,that the Third Pay Commission had considered the claim of Hearing Therapists,but did not accede to the grievances made by them. Since the Pay Commissionwas in better position to judge the volume of work, qualitative difference and thereliability and responsibility required of the two posts, this Court declined to
17accept the prayer made by the petitioner, under the principle of ‘equal pay forequal work’.12. Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union v. Union of India6, decided by a twoJudge bench: The workers’ union in the above case, had approached this Court,in the first instance in 1984, by filing writ petition no. 13924 of 1984. In the abovepetition, the relief claimed was for payment of wages under the principle of ‘equalpay for equal work’. The petitioners sought parity with employees of the NewDelhi Municipal Committee, and employees of other departments of the DelhiAdministration, and the Union of India. They approached this Court again byfiling civil writ petition no. 869 of 1988, which was disposed of by the judgmentcited above.(ii) The petitioners were employees of Grih Kalyan Kendras. They desired theUnion of India to pay them wages in the regular pay-scale, on par with otheremployees performing similar work under the New Delhi Municipal Committee, orthe Delhi Administration, or the Union of India. It would be relevant to mention,that the petitioner- Workers’ Union was representing employees working invarious centres of the Grih Kalyan Kendras, on ad-hoc basis. Some of themwere being paid a fixed salary, described as a honorarium, while others wereworking on piece-rate wages at the production centres, without there being anyprovision for any scale of pay or other benefits like gratuity, pension, providentfund etc.
6 (1991) 1 SCC 619
18(iii) In the first instance, this Court endeavoured to deal with the question,whether the employers of these workers were denying them wages as werebeing paid to other similarly placed employees, doing the same or similar work.The question came to be examined for the reason, that unless the petitionerscould demonstrate that the employees of the Grih Kalyan Kendras, were beingdiscriminated against on the subject of pay and other emoluments, with othersimilarly placed employees, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would notbe applicable. During the course of the first adjudication in writ petition no.13924 of 1984, this Court requested a former Chief Justice of India, to makerecommendations after taking into consideration, firstly, whether other similarlysituated employees (engaged in similar comparable posts, putting in comparablehours of work, in a comparable employment) were being paid higher pay, and ifso, what should be the entitlement of the agitating employees, so as not toviolate the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, and secondly, if there was noother similar comparable employment, whether the remuneration of the agitatingemployees, deserved to be revised on the ground, that their remuneration wasunconscionable or unfair, and if so, to what extent. In the report filed by theformer Chief Justice of India, it was concluded, that there was no employmentcomparable to the employment held by those engaged by the Grih KalyanKendras, and therefore, they could not seek parity with other employees workingeither with the New Delhi Municipal Committee, or the Delhi Administration, orthe Union of India.
19(iv) Based on the aforesaid factual conclusion, this Court held that the conceptof ‘equal pay for equal work’ implies and requires, equal treatment for those whoare similarly situated. It was held, that a comparison could not be drawnbetween unequals. Since the workers who had approached the Court in thepresent case, had failed to establish that they were situated similarly as others, itwas held, that they could not be extended benefits which were being given tothose, with whom they claimed parity. In this behalf this Court also opined, thatthe question as to whether persons were situated equally, had to be determinedby the application of broad and reasonable tests, and not by way of amathematical formula of exactitude. And therefore, since there were no otheremployees comparable to the employees working in the Grih Kalyan Kendras,this Court declined to entertain the prayer made by the petitioners.13. Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey7, decided by a two-Judge bench: Itwas the case of the respondent, that he was holding the post of Naik (RadioOperator), in which capacity he was discharging similar duties as thoseperformed in the Directorate of Coordination Police Wireless, and other centralgovernment agencies. It was also the claim of the respondent, that the dutiesperformed by him as Naik (Radio Operator) were more hazardous than thoseperformed by personnel with similar qualifications and experience in Stateservices, and other organizations. Even though a learned single Judge
7 (2000) 8 SCC 580
20dismissed the writ petition, an intra-Court appeal preferred by the respondent,was allowed.(ii) The Union of India raised three contentions, in its appeal to this Court.Firstly, that the pay-scale claimed by the respondent, was that of the post ofAssistant Sub-Inspector of Police. It was pointed out, that the respondent washolding an inferior post - of Naik (Radio Operator). It was highlighted, that thepost of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, was a promotional post, for the postheld by the respondent. Secondly, it was asserted on behalf of the Union ofIndia, that the respondent had not placed any material before the Court, on whichthe High Court could have arrived at the conclusion, that the essentialqualifications of the post against which the respondent claimed parity, as also,the method of recruitment thereto, were the same as that of the post held by therespondent. Thirdly, the post of Naik (Radio Operator) held by the respondentwas extended the benefit of special pay of Rs.80/- per month, and that, there wasnothing on the record of the case to show, that Radio Operators in the CentralWater Commission or the Directorate of Police Wireless, were enjoying similarbenefits.(iii) This Court while accepting the contentions advanced at the hands of theUnion of India held, that the pay-scale claimed by the respondent was that for thepost of Assistant Sub-Inspector, which admittedly was a promotional post forNaik (Radio Operator), i.e., the post held by the respondent. And as such, theclaim made by the respondent, of parity with a post superior in hierarchy (to thepost held by him), was not sustainable. Furthermore, this Court arrived at the
21conclusion, that there was no material on the record of the case to demonstrate,that the essential qualifications and the method of recruitment for, as also, theduties and responsibilities of the post held by him, were similar to those of thepost, against which the respondent was claiming parity.14. State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu8, decided by a three-Judgebench: Entry into the management cadre in banking establishments, is JuniorManagement Grade Scale-1. The said cadre comprises of Probationary Officers,Trainee Officers and other officers who possess technical skills (specializedofficers), such as Assistant Law Officers, Security Officers, Assistant Engineers,Technical Officers, Medical Officers, Rural Development Officers, and othertechnical posts. All the posts in the Junior Management Grade Scale-1 cadre,were divisible into two categories – generalist officers, and specialist officers.Under the prevalent rules – the 1979 Order, the benefit of a higher starting pay,was extended only to Probationary Officers and Trainee Officers (i.e. togeneralist officers), while Rural Development Officers and other specialist officerslike Assistant Law Officers, Security Officers, Assistant Engineers etc., were notentitled to a higher starting pay. Rural Development Officers, agitated their claimfor similar benefits, as were extended to Probationary Officers and TraineeOfficers (i.e. to the generalist officers). The question of viability of the claimraised by Rural Development Officers, was referred to the Bhatnagar Committee.The Bhatnagar Committee made its recommendation, in favour of Rural
8 (2002) 4 SCC 556
22Development Officers, finding that they were required to shoulder, by and large,the same duties and responsibilities, as Probationary Officers and TraineeOfficers, so far as agricultural advances were concerned. The Committeeaccordingly recommended, that it was a fit case for removal of the anomaly intheir salary fitment. It recommended that, Rural Development Officers beallowed the same fitment of salary at the time of appointment, as was extendedto Probationary Officers and Trainee Officers (i.e. to the generalist officers). Therecommendation made by the Bhatnagar Committee was accepted, andaccordingly, Rural Development Officers were extended the same fitment ofsalary, as generalist officers.(ii) Since the benefit of additional increment was denied to other specialistofficers, they also made a grievance and claimed the benefit of additionalincrements, as had been extended to Rural Development Officers. Since theState Bank of India did not accede to their request, they approached theKarnataka High Court. The specialist officers claimed, that in all respects, theyperformed similar duties and responsibilities, as Rural Development Officers, andtherefore, they were entitled to the benefit of additional increments, at the time oftheir appointment, as had been extended to Rural Development Officers. Alearned single Judge of the High Court, on being impressed by the fact, thatsome of the Rural Development Officers, who had not opted for absorption in thegeneralist cadre (but had continued under the specialist cadre), were alsoextended the benefit of higher starting pay, accepted the claim of the specialist
23officers. Appeals preferred against the judgment rendered by the learned singleJudge, were dismissed by a division bench of the High Court.(iii) This Court while examining the challenges, narrated the parameters onwhich the benefit of ‘equal pay for equal work’ can be made applicable, asunder:-“16. The principle of equal pay for equal work has been considered andapplied in many reported decisions of this Court. The principle has beenadequately explained and crystalised and sufficiently reiterated in a catenaof decisions of this Court. It is well settled that equal pay must dependupon the nature of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume ofwork; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability andresponsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make adifference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degreeand that there is an element of value judgment by those who are chargedwith the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions ofservice. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably onan intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object ofdifferentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. Theprinciple is not always easy to apply as there are inherent difficulties incomparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in differentorganizations, or even in the same organization. Differentiation in payscales of persons holding same posts and performing similar work on thebasis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability andconfidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The judgment ofadministrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach tothe post, and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent, would bea value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fidereasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the court.”Based on the aforesaid parameters, this Court considered the acceptability of theclaim of the specialist officers, for parity with the generalist officers. This Courtrecorded its conclusion, as under:-“19. We have carefully perused the order of the Bank and find thatseveral reasons have been given for non-acceptance of the respondents'claim. It has been highlighted that the Probationary Officers/TraineeOfficers are being recruited from market/promoted from clerical staff by theBank by means of all-India written test and interview to get the best talentfrom the market and within, with a view to man the Bank's top
24management in due course. Leaned counsel for the respondentssubmitted that the same is also true of specialist officers. However, it iscontended on behalf of the appellant Bank that the generalist officers areexposed to various assignments including mandatory rural assignments.Unlike them, the services of Assistant Law Officers are utilized as in-houseadvisors on legal matters in administrative offices. The duties andresponsibilities of Probationary Officers/Trainee Officers are more onerouswhile the specialist officers are not exposed to operational work/risk. It is,therefore, quite clear that there exists a valid distinction in the matter ofwork and nature of operations between the specialist officers and thegeneral category officers. The general category officers are directly linkedto the banking operations whereas the specialist officers are not so linkedand they perform the specified nature of work. RDOs were given similarfitment as the generalist officers since it was found that they were requiredto shoulder, by and large, the same duties and responsibilities asProbationary Officers and Trainee Officers in so far as conducting Bank'sagricultural advances work was concerned. This was done on the basis ofthe recommendations of the Bhatnagar Committee and keeping in view thefact that the decision has been taken that there would be no futurerecruitment of RDOs and the existing RDOs were proposed to beabsorbed in general banking cadre. The recruitment of RDOs has beendiscontinued since 1985. Taking into account the nature of duties andresponsibilities shouldered by the respondents the Bank has concludedthat the duties and responsibilities of the respondents are not comparableto the duties and responsibilities of the RDOs, the Probationary Officers orthe Trainee Officers.20. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that specialistofficers are also recruited from the open market and are confirmed aftersuccessfully completing the probation of 2 years. Before the Order of 1979came into force, they were similarly being granted benefit of additionalincrements at the time of appointment in the same manner as thegeneralist officers. However, after the order of 1979 they have beendeprived of this benefit. Subsequently that benefit was extended to RDOsbut not to the respondents and others like them. We have earlier noticedthat the RDOs were given the benefit of advance increments on the basisof the report of an Expert Committee which justified their classification withthe generalist officers, having regard to the nature of duties andresponsibilities shouldered by them. However, on consideration of thecase of the respondents, the Bank as reached a different conclusion. TheBank has found that their duties and responsibilities are not the same asthose of Probationary Officers/Trainee Officers/RDOs. It is no doubt truethat the specialist officers render useful service and their valuable advice inthe specialised fields is of great assistance to the Bank in its bankingoperations. The officers who belong to the generalist cadre, namely theofficers who actually conduct the banking operations and who takedecisions in regard to all banking works are advised by the specialist
25officers. There can be no doubt that the service rendered by the specialistofficers is also valuable, but that is not to say that the degree ofresponsibility and reliability is the same as those of the ProbationaryOfficers, the Trainee Officers, and the RDOs, who directly carry on thebanking operations and are required to take crucial decisions based on theadvice tendered by the specialist officers. The Bank has considered thenature of duties and responsibilities of the various categories of officersand has reached bona fide decision that while generalist officers take allcrucial decisions in banking operations with which they are directly linked,and are exposed to operational work and risk since the decisions that theytake has significant effect on the functioning of the bank and quality of itsperformance, the specialist officers are not exposed to such risks nor arethey required to take decisions as vital as those to be taken by thegeneralist officers. They at best render advice in their specialized field. Thedegree of reliability and responsibility is not the same. It cannot be saidthat the value judgment of the Bank in this regard is either unreasonable,arbitrary or irrational. Having regard to the settled principles and theparameters of judicial interference, we are of the considered view that thedecision taken by the Bank cannot be faulted on the ground of its beingeither unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory and therefore judicialinterference is inappropriate.”On account of the reasons recorded above, specialist officers could notsubstantiate their claim of parity. They were held not entitled to benefit of theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’15. State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association9,decided by a two-Judge bench: The respondent Association in the above case,filed a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking adirection to the appellant herein, to grant Personal Assistants in the CivilSecretariat, Haryana, the pay-scale of Rs.2000-3500 + Rs.150 as special pay,which had been given to Personal Assistants working in the Central Secretariat.The aforesaid prayer was made in the background of the fact, that the State of
9 (2002) 6 SCC 72
26Haryana had accepted the recommendations of the Fourth Central PayCommission, with regard to revision of pay-scales, with effect from 1.1.1986.The case of Personal Assistants before the High Court was, that prior to 1986,Personal Assistants working in the Civil Secretariat, Haryana, were enjoying ahigher scale of pay, than was extended to Personal Assistants working in theCentral Secretariat. On the receipt of Fourth Central Pay Commission report, theCentral Government revised the pay-scale of Personal Assistants to Rs.2000-3500 with effect from 1.1.1986. It was pointed out, that even though theGovernment of Haryana had accepted the recommendation of the Fourth CentralPay Commission, and had also implemented the same, in respect of certaincategories of employees, it did not accept the same in the case of PersonalAssistants. The pay-scale of Personal Assistants in the Civil Secretariat,Haryana, was revised to Rs.1640-2900 + 150 as special pay.(ii) It was also the contention of Personal Assistants, that in respect of certaincategories of employees of different departments of the State of Haryana, likeEducation, Police, Transport, Health and Engineering and Technical staff, theState Government had fully adopted the recommendations of the Fourth CentralPay Commission, by granting them the pay-scale of Rs.2000-3500. The claim ofthe Personal Assistants was also premised on the fact, that Personal Assistantsworking in the Civil Secretariat, Haryana, discharged duties which werecomparable with that of Personal Assistants in the Central Secretariat. And soalso, their responsibilities.
27(iii) The High Court allowed the claim of the Association. It held, that PersonalAssistants working in the Civil Secretariat, Haryana, were entitled to the payscale of Rs.2000-3500, with effect from 1.1.1986. The State of Haryanaapproached this Court. This Court, while recording its consideration, expressedthe view, that the High Court had ignored certain settled principles of law, whiledetermining the claim of Personal Assistants, by applying the principle of parity.This Court felt, that the High Court was persuaded to accept the claim ofPersonal Assistants, only because of the designation of their post. This, it washeld, was a misconceived application of the principle. In its analysis, it wasrecorded, that the High Court had assumed, that the assertions made at thebehest of the Personal Assistants, that they were discharging similar duties andresponsibilities as Personal Assistants in the Central Secretariat, had remainedunrebutted. That, this Court found, was factually incorrect. The State ofHaryana, in its counter affidavit before the High Court, had adopted the specificstance, that there was no comparison between the Personal Assistants workingin the Civil Secretariat, Haryana, and Personal Assistants working in the CentralSecretariat. It was highlighted, that the qualifications prescribed for PersonalAssistants in the Central Secretariat, were different from those prescribed forPersonal Assistants in Civil Secretariat, Haryana. The High Court was alsofound to have erred in its determination, by not making any comparison of thenature of duties and responsibilities, or about the qualifications prescribed forrecruitment. This Court accordingly set aside the order passed by the HighCourt, allowing parity.
28(iv) In order to delineate the parameters, on the basis of which the principle of‘equal pay for equal work’ can be made applicable, this Court observed asunder:-“10. It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for equal work isnot a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutionalgoal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determinationof parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for theexecutive to discharge. While taking a decision in the matter severalrelevant factors, some of which have been noted by this Court in thedecided case, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financialposition and capacity of the State Government to bear the additionalliability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind that thepriority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of theState Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the StateGovernment. In the context of complex nature of issues involved, the farreaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on theadministration of the State Government courts have taken the view thatordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisionspertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matteris not justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any proceeding againstsuch administrative decision taken by the Government. The courts shouldapproach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they aresatisfied that the decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjustand prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while takingthe decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for adecision in the matter. Even in a case where the court holds the orderpassed by the Government to be unsustainable then ordinarily a directionshould be given to the State Government or the authority taking thedecision to reconsider the matter and pass a proper order. The courtshould avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay andcompelling the government to implement the same. As noted earlier, in thepresent case the High Court has not even made any attempt to comparethe nature of duties and responsibilities of the two sections of theemployees, one in the State Secretariat and the other in the CentralSecretariat. It has also ignored the basic principle that there are certainrules, regulations and executive instructions issued by the employerswhich govern the administration of the cadre.”
2916. Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty10,decided by a two-Judge bench: The respondent in the above case, wasappointed as a Typist in 1990, on a consolidated salary of Rs.530/- per month,against a vacancy of the post of Junior Assistant. It was his averment, that eventhough in the appointment order, he was shown to have been appointed againstthe post of Typist, he had actually been working as a Junior Assistant, in theExamination Section of the institute. In order to demonstrate the aforesaidfactual position, the respondent placed reliance on two certificates dated4.12.1993 and 25.3.1996, issued to him by the Dean of the institute, affirming hisstance. Despite the passage of five years since his induction into service, hewas paid the same consolidated salary (referred to above), and was also notbeing regularized. It was also pointed out, that another individual junior to himwas regularized against the post of Junior Assistant. The respondent thenapproached the Orissa High Court by way of a writ petition, seeking appointmenton regular basis. The High Court disposed of the said writ petition, by directing,that the respondent be not disengaged from service. The High Court furtherdirected, that the respondent be paid salary in the regular scale of pay admissibleto Junior Assistants, with effect from September, 1997. A review petition filedagainst the High Court’s order dated 11.9.1997, was dismissed. Dissatisfied withthe above orders, the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology approached
10 (2003) 5 SCC 188
30this Court. While dealing with the question of ‘equal pay for equal work’, thisCourt, noticed the factual position as under:-“10. The High Court before directing to give regular pay-scale to therespondent w.e.f. September, 1997 on the principle of “equal pay for equalwork” did not examine the pleadings and facts of the case in order toappreciate whether the respondent satisfied the relevant requirementssuch as the nature of work done by him as compared to the nature of workdone by the regularly appointed Junior Assistants, the qualifications,responsibilities etc. When the services of the respondent had not beenregularized, his appointment was on temporary basis on consolidated payand he had not undergone the process for regular recruitment, direction togive regular pay-scale could not be given that too without examining therelevant factors to apply the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. It isclear from the averments made in the writ petition extracted above, nothingis stated as regards the nature of work, responsibilities attached to therespondent without comparing them with the regularly recruited JuniorAssistants. It cannot be disputed that there were neither necessaryaverments in the writ petition nor any material was placed before the HighCourt so as to consider the application of principle of “equal pay for equalwork”.”Based on the fact, that the respondent had not placed sufficient material on therecord of the case, to demonstrate the applicability of the principle of ‘equal payfor equal work’, this Court set aside the order passed by the High Court, directingthat the respondent be paid wages in the regular scale of pay, with effect fromSeptember, 1997.17. Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy11, decided by a three-Judge bench:There were two technical posts, namely, Operator-cum-Mechanic and SubAssistant Engineer, in the Irrigation Department, of the Government of WestBengal. In 1970, the State Government revised pay-scales. During theaforesaid revision, the pay-scale of the post of Operator-cum-Mechanic, which
11 (2004) 1 SCC 347
31was initially Rs.180-350, was revised to Rs.230-425, with effect from 1.4.1970.The pay-scale of the post of Sub-Assistant Engineer was simultaneously revisedto Rs.350-600, with a higher initial start of Rs.330, with effect from the samedate. Some persons in the category of Operator-cum-Mechanic, possessing thequalification of diploma in engineering, claimed entitlement to the nomenclatureof Sub-Assistant Engineer, as also, the scale of pay prescribed for the post ofSub-Assistant Engineer. The Government of West Bengal, during the course ofhearing of the matter before this Court, adopted the position, that diploma holderengineers working as Operator-cum-Mechanics in the Irrigation Department,were not entitled to be designated as Sub-Assistant Engineers. The said pleawas negatived by this Court in State of West Bengal v. Debdas Kumar, 1991Supp. (1) SCC 138.(ii) Another group of Operator-cum-Mechanics, who did not possess diplomain engineering, and were graduates in science, or were holding school finalexamination certificate, claimed parity with Operator-cum-Mechanics, possessingthe qualification of diploma in engineering. This Court, while rejecting their claim,observed as under:-“30. The respondents are merely graduates in Science. They do nothave the requisite technical qualification. Only because they aregraduates, they cannot, in our opinion, claim equality with the holders ofdiploma in Engineering. If any relief is granted by this Court to therespondents on the aforementioned ground, the same will be incontravention of the statutory rules. It is trite that this Court even inexercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of Indiawould not ordinarily grant such a relief which would be in violation of astatutory provision.”
3218. S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand12, decided by a two-Judge bench: Inthe above matter, a number of civil appeals were disposed of, through a commonorder. The appellants had approached the High Court with the prayer, thatdirections be issued to the respondents, to fix their pay-scale at par with the payscale of government secondary school teachers, or at par with Grade I and IIClerks of the respondent company (Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. – BCCL). Theappellants also prayed, that facilities such as provident fund, gratuity, pensionand other retiral benefits, should also be made available to them. In addition tothe above prayers, the appellants also sought a direction, that the managementof the school, be taken over by the State Government. Dissatisfied with theorders passed by the High Court, the employees of the school approached thisCourt. This Court disposed of the matter by recording the following conclusion:-“21. Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on Article 39(d) of theConstitution. Article 39(d) does not mean that all the teachers working inthe school should be equated with the clerks in BCCL or the Governmentof Jharkhand for application of the principle of equal pay for equal work.There should be total identity between both groups i.e. the teachers of theschool on the one hand and the clerks in BCCL, and as such the teacherscannot be equated with the clerks of the State Government or of BCCL.The question of application of Article 39(d) of the Constitution has recentlybeen interpreted by this Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh,(2006) 9 SCC 321, wherein Their Lordships have put the entirecontroversy to rest and held that the principle, “equal pay for equal work”must satisfy the test that the incumbents are performing equal andidentical work as discharged by employees against whom the equal pay isclaimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the cases bearing on thesubject and after a detailed discussion have finally put the controversy torest that the persons who claimed the parity should satisfy the court thatthe conditions are identical and equal and same duties are beingdischarged by them. Though a number of cases were cited for our
12 (2007) 8 SCC 279
33consideration but no useful purpose will be served as in State of Haryanav. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321, all these cases have been reviewedby this Court. More so, when we have already held that the appellants arenot the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking any parity of thepay with that of the clerks of BCCL.”A perusal of the determination rendered by this Court reveals, that for claimingparity under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, there should be totalidentity between the post held by the claimants, and the reference post, withwhom parity is claimed.19. Official Liquidator v. Dayanand13, decided by a three-Judge bench:Directions were issued by the Calcutta and Delhi High Courts to the appellant, inthe above matter, to absorb persons employed by the Official Liquidators(attached to those High Courts) under Rule 308 of the Companies (Court) Rules,1959, against sanctioned posts, in the Department of Company Affairs. By virtueof the above directions, the respondents who were employed/engaged by OfficialLiquidators, were paid salaries and allowances from the Company’s funds. Thequestion that arose for consideration before this Court was, whether therespondents were entitled to sanctioned Government posts, in the office of theOfficial Liquidator(s). While disposing of the above issue, this Court held asunder:-“100. As mentioned earlier, the respondents were employed/engaged bythe Official Liquidators pursuant to the sanction accorded by the Courtunder Rule 308 of the 1959 Rules and they are paid salaries andallowances from the company fund. They were neither appointed againstsanctioned posts nor were they paid out from the Consolidated Fund ofIndia. Therefore, the mere fact that they were doing work similar to the
13 (2008) 10 SCC 1
34regular employees of the Offices of the Official Liquidators cannot betreated as sufficient for applying the principle of equal pay for equal work.Any such direction will compel the Government to sanction additional postsin the Offices of the Official Liquidators so as to facilitate payment ofsalaries and allowances to the company-paid staff in the regular pay scalefrom the Consolidate Fund of India and in view of our finding that the policydecision taken by the Government of India to reduce the number of postsmeant for direct recruitment does not suffer from any legal or constitutionalinfirmity, it is not possible to entertain the plea of the respondents forpayment of salaries and allowances in the regular pay scales and othermonetary benefits on a par with regular employees by applying theprinciple of equal pay for equal work.”20. State of West Bengal v. West Bengal Minimum Wages InspectorsAssociation14, decided by a two-Judge bench: The respondent Associationrepresented the cadre of Inspector (Agricultural Minimum Wages), before theHigh Court of Calcutta. The claim made before the High Court was, that the saidcadre was entitled to parity in pay-scales, with the posts of Inspector(Cooperative Societies), Extension Officer (Panchayats) and Revenue Officer.The aforesaid claim of parity was based on the sole consideration, that the postsof Inspector (Agricultural Minimum Wages) on the one hand, and the posts ofInspector (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officer (Panchayats) and RevenueOfficer on the other, were in the same pay-scale, prior to the revision of payscales, i.e., Pay-Scale 9 (– Rs.300-600). After the pay revision in 1981, while theInspector (Agricultural Minimum Wages) cadre, was retained in Pay-Scale 9 (–Rs.300-600), the other three cadres – Inspector (Cooperative Societies),Extension Officer (Panchayats) and Revenue Officer, were placed in Pay-Scale11 (– Rs.425-1050). It was based on the above factual assertion, that the
14 (2010) 5 SCC 225
35respondents claimed placement in Pay-Scale 11 (- Rs.425-1050). The claim ofthe respondents, was not based on the assertion, that Inspectors (AgriculturalMinimum Wages) were discharging duties and responsibilities, which weresimilar/identical to those of Inspectors (Cooperative Societies), ExtensionOfficers (Panchayats) and Revenue Officers. It is this aspect, which weighedwith this Court while determining the claim of the respondents for parity. In theabove adjudication, this Court recorded the following observations:-“20. The burden to prove disparity is on the employees claiming parity –vide State of U.P. v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh, (1998) 1 SCC 422;Associate Banks Officers’ Association v. SBI, (1998) 1 SCC 428; State ofHaryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6SCC 72; State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (2003) 6 SCC 123; S.C. Chandra v.State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 and U.P. SEB v. Aziz Ahmad,(2009) 2 SCC 606.21. What is significant in this case is that parity is claimed by Inspectors,AMW, by seeking extension of the pay scale applicable to Inspector(Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayat) and KGO-JLRO(Revenue Officers) not on the basis that the holders of those posts wereperforming similar duties or functions as Inspectors, AMW. On the otherhand, the relief was claimed on the ground that prior to ROPA Rules 1981,the posts in the said three reference categories, and Inspectors, AMWwere all in the same pay scale (Pay Scale 9), and that under ROPA Rules1981, those other three categories have been given a higher Pay Scale ofNo.11, while they – Inspectors, AMW - were discriminated by continuingthem in the Pay Scale 9.22. The claim in the writ petition was not based on the ground thatsubject post and reference category posts carried similar or identical dutiesand responsibilities but on the contention that as the subject post holdersand the holders of reference category posts who were enjoying equal payat an earlier point of time, should be continued to be given equal pay evenafter pay revision. In other words, the parity claimed was not on the basisof equal pay for equal work, but on the basis of previous equal pay.23. It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed merely on thebasis that earlier the subject post and the reference category posts werecarrying the same scale of pay. In fact, one of the functions of the PayCommission is to identify the posts which deserve a higher scale of paythan what was earlier being enjoyed with reference to their duties andresponsibilities, and extend such higher scale to those categories of posts.
3624. The Pay Commission has two functions; to revise the existing payscale, by recommending revised pay scales corresponding to the prerevised pay scales and, secondly, make recommendations for upgradingor downgrading posts resulting in higher pay scales or lower pay scales,depending upon the nature of duties and functions attached to those posts.Therefore, the mere fact that at an earlier point of time, two posts werecarrying the same pay scale does not mean that after the implementationof revision in pay scales, they should necessarily have the same revisedpay scale.25. As noticed above, one post which is considered as having a lesserpay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and another post which isconsidered to have a proper pay scale may merely be assigned thecorresponding revised pay scale but not any higher pay scale. Therefore,the benefit of higher pay scale can only be claimed by establishing thatholders of the subject post and holders of reference category posts,discharge duties and functions identical with, or similar to, each other andthat the continuation of disparity is irrational and unjust.”Based on the above consideration, this Court observed, that Inspectors(Agricultural Minimum Wages), had neither pleaded nor proved, that they weredischarging duties and functions similar to the duties and functions of theInspectors (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayats) andRevenue Officers, and therefore held, that their claim for pay parity, under theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’, could not be accepted.21. Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur15, decided bya two-Judge bench: In the above matter, the respondents were working asSenior Dieticians and Dieticians in the Directorate of Health Services of theChandigarh Administration. They were posted in the General Hospital,Chandigarh, under the Union Territory Administration of Chandigarh. They wereplaced in the pay-scale of Rs.1500-2540 and Rs.1350-2400, respectively. They
15 (2011) 2 SCC 452
37moved the Chandigarh Administration, seeking the pay-scale extended to theircounterparts, employed in the State of Punjab. The posts against which theywere claiming equivalence, were those of Dietician (gazetted) and Dietician (nongazetted) in the Directorate of Research and Medical Education, Punjab. Theposts with which they were seeking equivalence, were sanctioned posts in theRajindera Hospital (Patiala) and the Shri Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital (Amritsar).These posts were in the pay-scale of Rs.2200-4000 and Rs.1500-2640,respectively. After the State Government declined to accept their claim, theyapproached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which accepted their claim.Dissatisfied with the judgment rendered by the High Court, the Union TerritoryAdministration of Chandigarh, approached this Court.(ii) During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, a direction wasissued to the Union Territory Administration of Chandigarh, to appoint a ‘HighLevel Equivalence Committee’, to examine the nature of duties andresponsibilities of the post of Senior Dietician working under the Union TerritoryAdministration of Chandigarh, vis-a-vis, Dietician (gazetted) working under theState of Punjab. And also to examine the nature of duties and responsibilities ofthe post of Dietician, working under the Union Territory Administration ofChandigarh, vis-a-vis, Dietician (non-gazetted) working under the State ofPunjab, and submit a report. A report was accordingly submitted to this Court(which is extracted in the above judgment).(iii) In its report, the ‘High Level Equivalence Committee’ arrived at theconclusion, that the duties and responsibilities of the posts held by the
38respondents, and the corresponding reference posts with which they wereclaiming parity, were not comparable or equivalent. As such, this Court recordedthe following observations:-“9. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. We find from thereport of the High Level Equivalence Committee extracted above that theDirectorate of Research and Medical Education, Punjab, is a teachinginstitution in which the Dietician has to perform multifarious duties such asteaching the probationary nurses in subjects of nutrition dietaries, controland management of the kitchen, etc., whereas, the main duties of theDietician and Senior Dietician in the Government Multi-Specialty Hospitalin the Union Territory Chandigarh are only to check the quality of foodbeing provided to the patients and to manage the kitchen.”Based on the above determination, the prayer for parity under the principle of‘equal pay for equal work’ was declined to the respondents, and accordingly thejudgment of the High Court, was set aside.22. Steel Authority of India Limited v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya16, decided by athree-Judge bench: The respondent in the above case, was appointed againstthe post of Speech Therapist/Audiologist, in the Durgapur Steel Plant, in S-6grade in Medical and Health Services. After serving for a few years, headdressed a representation to the appellant, claiming parity with one B.V.Prabhakar, employed at the Rourkela Steel Plant (a different unit of the samecompany). The said B.V. Prabhakar was holding the post of E-1 grade in theexecutive cadre, though designated as Speech Therapist/Audiologist. In hisrepresentation, the respondent did not claim parity in pay, but only claimed
16 (2011) 11 SCC 122
39change of the cadre and upgradation of his post, and accordingly relaxation ineligibility, so as to be entitled to be placed in the pay-scale of posts in E-1 grade.(ii) The appellant did not accept the claim raised by the respondent. Heaccordingly approached the High Court of Calcutta. A division bench of the HighCourt, accepted his claim for pay parity. It is in the aforesaid background, thatthe appellant approached this Court, to assail the judgment rendered by the HighCourt. The issue of pay parity was dealt with by this Court, by recording thefollowing observations:-“30. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to theeffect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions ofArticles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that theeligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work andduties and effort, reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional need andresponsibilities and status of both the posts are identical. The functionsmay be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really andsubstantially different. The other post may not require any higherqualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scalesdepends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts.The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and provethat all things are equal between the posts concerned. Such a complexissue cannot be adjudicated by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties.31. The onus to establish the discrimination by the employer lies on theperson claiming the parity of pay. The Expert Committee has to decidesuch issues, as the fixation of pay scales etc. falls within the exclusivedomain of the executive. So long as the value judgment of those who areresponsible for administration i.e. service conditions, etc., is found to bebonafide, reasonable, and on intelligible criteria which has a rational nexusof objective of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount todiscrimination. It is not prohibited in law to have two grades of posts in thesame cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may not be the soledeterminative factor. The courts in exercise of their limited power of judicialreview can only examine whether the decision of the State authorities isrational and just or prejudicial to a particular set of employees. The courthas to keep in mind that a mere difference in service conditions does notamount to discrimination. Unless there is complete andwholesale/wholesome identity between the two posts they should not betreated as equivalent and the Court should avoid applying the principle ofequal pay for equal work.”
40Based on the above consideration, this Court recorded its analysis, on the meritsof the controversy, as under:-“34. Shri B.V. Prabhakar, had been appointed in E-1 Grade, in theRourkela unit, considering his past services in the Bokaro Steel Plant,another unit of the Company, for about two decades prior to therecruitment of the respondent. As every unit may make appointmentstaking into consideration the local needs and requirement, such parityclaimed by the respondent cannot be held to be tenable. The reliefs soughtby the respondent for upgradation of the post and waiving the eligibilitycriteria had rightly been refused by the appellants and by the learnedSingle Judge. In such a fact-situation, there was no justification for theDivision Bench to allow the writ petition, granting the benefit from the dateof initial appointment of the respondent. The respondent has not producedany tangible material to substantiate his claim, thus, he could notdischarge the onus of proof to establish that he had made some justifiableclaim. The respondent miserably failed to make out a case for pay parity tothe post of E-1 Grade in executive cadre. The appeal, thus, deserves to beallowed.”It is, therefore apparent, that this Court did not accept the prayer of pay parity, inthe above cited case, based on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.23. Hukum Chand Gupta v. Director General, Indian Council of AgriculturalResearch17, decided by a two-Judge bench: In the above matter, the appellantwas originally appointed as a Laboratory Assistant in Group D, in the NationalDairy Research Institute. He was promoted as a Lower Division Clerk, after hequalified a limited departmental competitive examination. He was furtherpromoted as a Senior Clerk, again after qualifying a limited departmentalcompetitive examination. At this stage, he was placed in the pay-scale ofRs.1200-2040. He was further promoted to the post of Superintendent in thepay-scale of Rs.1640-2900, yet again, after passing a departmental examination.
17 (2012) 12 SCC 666
41Eventually, he was promoted as an Assistant Administrative Officer, on the basisof seniority-cum-fitness. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research revised thepay-scales of Assistants, from Rs.1400-2600 to Rs.1640-2900, with effect from1.1.1986. However, the pay-scale of the post of Superintendent was not revised.(ii) The appellant submitted a representation seeking revision of his pay-scaleon the ground, that in the headquarters of the Indian Council of AgriculturalResearch, the post of Superintendent is a promotional post, from the post ofAssistant (which carried the pay-scale of Rs.1640-2900). He also claimed parityin pay-scale with one J.I.P. Madan. The claim of the appellant was not acceptedby the authorities, whereupon, he first approached the Administrative Tribunaland eventually the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which also did not accepthis contention. It is, therefore, that he approached this Court.(iii) While adjudicating upon the above controversy, this Court relied andendorsed the reasons recorded by the Administrative Tribunal in rejecting theclaim of the appellant in the following manner:-“9. By a detailed order, the Tribunal rejected both the claims. It wasobserved that the post at headquarters cannot be compared with the postat institutional level as both are governed by different sets of service rules.The second prayer with regard to the higher pay scale given to Shri J.I.P.Madan was rejected on the ground that he had been given the benefit ofsecond upgradation in pay since he had earned only one promotionthroughout his professional career. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, theappellant filed a writ petition C.W.P. No. 9595 CAT of 2004 before the HighCourt. The writ petition has also been dismissed by judgment dated 8-7-2008. This judgment is impugned in the present appeal.”This Court, recorded the following additional reasons, for not accepting the claimof the appellant, by observing as under:-
42“15. In our opinion, the explanation given by Mrs. Sunita Rao does notleave any room for doubt that the claim made by the appellant is whollymisconceived. There is no comparison between the appellant and ShriJ.I.P. Madan. The appellant had duly earned promotion in his cadre fromthe lowest rank to the higher rank. Having joined in Group D, he retired onthe post of AAO. On the other hand, Shri J.I.P. Madan had been working inthe same pay scale till his promotion on the post of AAO. Therefore, hewas held entitled to the second upgradation after 24 years of service. Hehad joined as an Assistant by Direct Recruitment and promoted on24-8-1990 as a Superintendent. After the merger of the post of Assistantwith the Superintendent, the earlier promotion of Shri Madan was nullified,as Assistant was no longer a feeder post for the promotion on the post ofSuperintendent. Thus, a financial upgradation, in view of ACP Scheme,was granted to him since he had no opportunity for the second promotion.”This Court concluded the issue by holding as under:-“20. We are also not inclined to accept the submission of the appellantthat there can be no distinction in the pay scales between the employeesworking at headquarters and the employees working at the institutionallevel. It is a matter of record that the employees working at headquartersare governed by a completely different set of rules. Even the hierarchy ofthe posts and the channels of promotion are different. Also, merelybecause any two posts at the headquarters and the institutional level havethe same nomenclature, would not necessarily require that the pay scaleson the two posts should also be the same. In our opinion, the prescriptionof two different pay scales would not violate the principle of equal pay forequal work. Such action would not be arbitrary or violate Articles 14, 16and 39D of the Constitution of India. It is for the employer to categorize theposts and to prescribe the duties of each post. There can not be anystraitjacket formula for holding that two posts having the samenomenclature would have to be given the same pay scale. Prescription ofpay scales on particular posts is a very complex exercise. It requiresassessment of the nature and quality of the duties performed and theresponsibilities shouldered by the incumbents on different posts. Eventhough, the two posts may be referred to by the same name, it would notlead to the necessary inference that the posts are identical in everymanner. These are matters to be assessed by expert bodies like theemployer or the Pay Commission. Neither the Central AdministrativeTribunal nor a Writ Court would normally venture to substitute its ownopinion for the opinions rendered by the experts. The Tribunal or the WritCourt would lack the necessary expertise undertake the complex exerciseof equation of posts or the pay scales.21. In expressing the aforesaid opinion, we are fortified by theobservations made by this Court in State of Punjab vs. Surjit Singh, (2009)9 SCC 514. In that case, upon review of a large number of judicial
43precedents relating to the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, this Courtobserved as follows: (SCC pp. 527-28, para 19)“19. … ‘19. … Undoubtedly, the doctrine of “equal pay for equalwork” is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced ina court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value.The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has no mechanicalapplication in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classificationbased on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited andgrouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, thequalities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to theobject sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experiencecan be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay inorder to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale toavoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotionalavenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation….. Amere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or acraftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doingthe same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service.The quality of work which is produced may be different and even thenature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparisonof physical activity. The application of the principle of “equal pay forequal work” requires consideration of various dimensions of a givenjob. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entailmay differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume ofwork. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability andresponsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilitiesmake a difference. Thus, normally the applicability of this principlemust be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body.These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere.Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should berequired to raise a dispute in this regard. In any event, the party whoclaims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary avermentsand prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction canbe issued by a court, the court must first see that there arenecessary averments and there is a proof.’*” (emphasis supplied)In our opinion, the aforesaid observations would be a complete answer toall the submissions made by the appellant.”For the above reasons, this Court rejected the claim of the appellant, based onthe principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
4424. National Aluminum Company Limited v. Ananta Kishore Rout18, decided bya two-Judge bench: The appellant in the above matter, i.e., National AluminumCompany Limited (hereinafter referred to as, NALCO) had established twoschools. In the first instance, NALCO itself looked after the management of thesaid schools. In 1985, it entered into two separate but identical agreements withthe Central Chinmoy Mission Trust, Bombay, whereby the management of theschools was entrusted to the above trust. In 1990, a similar agreement wasentered into for the management of the above two schools, with the SaraswatiVidya Mandir Society (affiliated to Vidya Bharati Akhila Bharatiya ShikshaSansthan). Accordingly, with effect from 1990, the said Society commenced tomanage the affairs of the employees, of the above two schools. Two writpetitions were filed by the employees of the two schools before the High Court ofOrissa at Cuttack, seeking a mandamus, that they be declared as employees ofNALCO, and be treated as such, with the consequential prayer, that theemployees of the two schools be accorded suitable pay-scales, as wereadmissible to the employees of NALCO. The High Court accepted the aboveprayers. It is, therefore, that NALCO approached this Court.(ii) In adjudicating upon the above matter, this Court recorded itsconsideration as under:-“33. Insofar as their service conditions are concerned, as alreadyconceded by even the respondents themselves, their salaries and otherperks which they are getting are better than their counter parts inGovernment schools or aided/ unaided recognised schools in the State of
18 (2014) 6 SCC 756
45Orissa. In a situation like this even if, for the sake of argument, it ispresumed that NALCO is the employer of these employees, they would notbe entitled to the pay scales which are given to other employees ofNALCO as there cannot be any comparison between the two. The principleof ‘‘equal pay for equal work’’ is not attracted at all. Those employeesdirectly employed by NALCO are discharging altogether different kinds ofduties. Main activity of NALCO is the manufacture and production ofalumina and aluminium for which it has its manufacturing units. Theprocess and method of recruitment of those employees, their eligibilityconditions for appointment, nature of job done by those employees etc. isentirely different from the employees of these schools. This aspect issquarely dealt with in the case of SC Chandra vs. State of Jharkhand,(2007) 8 SCC 279, where the plea for parity in employment was rejectedthereby refusing to give parity in salary claim by school teachers with classworking under Government of Jharkhand and BCCL. The discussion whichensued, while rejecting such a claim, is recapitulated hereunder in themajority opinion authored by A.K. Mathur, J.: (SCC p. 289, paras 20-21)“20. After going through the order of the Division Bench we are ofopinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Courtis correct. Firstly, the school is not being managed by BCCL as fromthe facts it is more than clear that BCCL was only extending financialassistance from time to time. By that it cannot be saddled with theliability to pay these teachers of the school as being paid to theclerks working with BCCL or in the Government of Jharkhand. It isessentially a school managed by a body independent of themanagement of BCCL. Therefore, BCCL cannot be saddled with theresponsibilities of granting the teachers the salaries equated to thatof the clerks working in BCCL.21. Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on Article 39(d)of the Constitution. Article 39(d) does not mean that all the teachersworking in the school should be equated with the clerks in BCCL orthe Government of Jharkhand for application of the principle of equalpay for equal work. There should be total identity between bothgroups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand and the clerksin BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be educated with theclerks of the State Government or of BCCL. The question ofapplication of Article 39(d) of the Constitution has recently beeninterpreted by this Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh,(2006) 9 SCC 321, wherein Their Lordships have put the entirecontroversy to rest and held that the principle, 'equal pay for equalwork' must satisfy the test that the incumbents are performing equaland identical work as discharged by employees against whom theequal pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the casesbearing on the subject and after a detailed discussion have finallyput the controversy to rest that the persons who claimed the parityshould satisfy the court that the conditions are identical and equal
46and same duties are being discharged by them. Though a number ofcases were cited for our consideration but no useful purpose will beserved as in Charanjit Singh all these cases have been reviewed bythis Court. More so, when we have already held that the appellantsare not the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking anyparity of the pay with that of the clerks of BCCL.”Based on the above consideration, this Court recorded its conclusion as follows:-“35. We say at the cost of repetition that there is no parity in the nature ofwork, mode of appointment, experience, educational qualificationsbetween the NALCO employees and the employees of the two schools. Infact, such a comparison can be made with their counter parts in theGovernment schools and/or aided or unaided schools. On that parameter,there cannot be any grievance of the staff which is getting betteremoluments and enjoying far superior service conditions.”It is, therefore apparent, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ was heldto be not applicable to the employees of the two schools, so as to enable them toclaim parity, with the employees of NALCO.25. We shall now attempt an analysis of the decisions rendered by this Court,wherein temporary employees (differently designated as work-charge, dailywage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like) raised a claim for being extendedwages, equal to those being drawn by regular employees, and the parametersdetermined by this Court, in furtherance of such a claim. Insofar as the presentcontroversy is concerned, the same falls under the present category.26. Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P.19, decided by a two-Judge bench: TwoClass-IV employees of the Nehru Yuvak Kendra, Dehradun, engaged as casualworkers on daily-wage basis, claimed that they were doing the same work asClass-IV employees appointed on regular basis. The reason for denying them
19 (1986) 1 SCC 637
47the pay-scale extended to regular employees was, that there was no sanctionedpost to accommodate the petitioners, and as such, the assertion on behalf of therespondent-employer was, that they could not be extended the benefitspermissible to regular employees. Furthermore, their claim was sought to berepudiated on the ground, that the petitioners had taken up their employmentwith the Nehru Yuvak Kendra knowing fully well, that they would be paidemoluments of casual workers engaged on daily-wage basis, and therefore, theycould not claim beyond what they had voluntarily accepted.(ii) This Court held, that it was not open to the Government to exploit citizens,specially when India was a welfare state, committed to a socialist pattern ofsociety. The argument raised by the Government was found to be violative of themandate of equality, enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court heldthat the mandate of Article 14 ensured, that there would be equality before lawand equal protection of the law. It was inferred therefrom, that there must be‘equal pay for equal work’. Having found, that employees engaged by differentNehru Yuvak Kendras in the country were performing similar duties as regularClass-IV employees in its employment, it was held, that they must get the samesalary and conditions of service as regular Class-IV employees, and that, it madeno difference whether they were appointed on sanctioned posts or not. So longas they were performing the same duties, they must receive the same salary.
4827. Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD20, decided by a two-Judgebench: The petitioners in the instant case were employed by the Central PublicWorks Department on daily-wage basis. They demanded the same wage as wasbeing paid to permanent employees, doing identical work. Herein, therespondent-employer again contested the claim, by raising the plea thatpetitioners could not be employed on regular and permanent basis for want ofpermanent posts. One of the objections raised to repudiate the claim of thepetitioners was, that the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ was a mereabstract doctrine and was not capable of being enforced in law.(ii) The objection raised by the Government was rejected. It was held, that allorgans of the State were committed to the directive principles of the State policy.It was pointed out, that Article 39 enshrined the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’, and accordingly this Court concluded, that the principle of ‘equal pay forequal work’ was not an abstract doctrine. It was held to be a vital and vigorousdoctrine accepted throughout the world, particularly by all socialist countries.Referring to the decision rendered by this Court in the D.S. Nakara case2, it washeld, that the above proposition had been affirmed by a Constitution Bench ofthis Court. It was held, that the Central Government, the State Governments andlikewise, all public sector undertakings, were expected to function like model andenlightened employers and further, the argument that the above principle wasmerely an abstract doctrine, which could not be enforced through a Court of law,
20 (1986) 1 SCC 639
49could not be raised either by the State or by State undertakings. The petitionswere accordingly allowed, and the Nehru Yuvak Kendras were directed to pay alldaily-rated employees, salaries and allowances as were paid to regularemployees, from the date of their engagement.28. Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana21, decided by a two-Judge bench: TheEducation Department of the State of Haryana, was pursuing an adult educationscheme, sponsored by the Government of India, under the National AdultEducation Scheme. The object of the scheme was to provide functional literacyto illiterates, in the age group of 15 to 35, as also, to impart learning throughspecial contract courses, to students in the age group of 6 to 15, comprising ofdropouts from schools. The petitioners were appointed as Supervisors. Theywere paid remuneration at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month, as fixed salary. Priorto 7.3.1984, they were paid fixed salary and allowance, at the rate of Rs.60/- permonth. Thereafter, the fixed salary was enhanced to Rs.150/- per month. Thereason for allowing them fixed salary was, that they were required to work, onlyon part-time basis. The case set up by the State Government was, that thepetitioners were not full-time employees; their mode of recruitment was differentfrom Supervisors engaged on regular basis; the nature of functions dischargedby them, was not similar to those discharged by Supervisors engaged in theregular cadre; and their appointments were made for a period of six months,
21 (1987) 4 SCC 634
50because the posts against which they were appointed, were sanctioned for oneyear at a time.(ii) Having examined the controversy, this Court rejected all the abovesubmissions advanced on behalf of the State Government. It was held, that theduties discharged by the petitioners even though for a shorter duration, were notany different from Supervisors, engaged in the regular cadre. Even thoughrecruitment of Supervisors in the regular cadre was made by the SubordinateSelection Board by way of an open selection, whereas the petitioners wereselected through a process of consideration which was limited to a cluster of afew villages, it was concluded that, that could not justify the denial to thepetitioners, wages which were being paid to Supervisors, working in the regularcadre. It was held, that so long as the petitioners were doing work, which wassimilar to the work of Supervisors engaged in the regular cadre, they could not bedenied parity in their wages. Accordingly it was held, that from the standpoint ofthe doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’, the petitioners could not bediscriminated against, in regard to pay-scales. Having concluded that thepetitioners possess the essential qualification for appointment to the post ofSupervisor, and further the duties discharged by them were similar to thoseappointed on regular basis, it was held, that the petitioners could not be deniedwages payable to regular employees. This Court also declined the pleacanvassed on behalf of the Government, that they were engaged in a temporaryscheme against posts which were sanctioned on year to year basis. On theinstant aspect of the matter, it was held, that the same had no bearing to the
51principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. It was held, that the only relevantconsideration was, whether the nature of duties and functions discharged and thework done was similar. While concluding, this Court clarified that in the instantcase, it was dealing with temporary employees engaged by the same employer,doing work of the same nature, as was being required of those engaged in theregular cadre, on a regular basis. It was held, that the petitioners, who wereengaged on temporary basis as Supervisors, were entitled to be paid on thesame basis, and in the same pay-scale, at which those employed in the regularcadre discharging similar duties as Supervisors, were being paid.29. Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&T Department throughBhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India22, decided by a two-Judgebench: The persons on whose behalf the Mazdoor Manch had approached thisCourt under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, were working as daily-ratedcasual labourers, in the Posts and Telegraphs Department. They included threebroad categories of workers, namely, unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled. Theunskilled labour consisted of Safai Workers, Helpers, Peons, and the like. Theunskilled labour was engaged in digging, carrying loads and other similar types ofwork. The semi-skilled labour consisted of Carpenters, Wiremen, Draftsmen,A.C. Mechanics etc. They needed to have technical experience, but were notrequired to possess any degree or diploma qualification. The skilled labour
22 (1988) 1 SCC 122
52consisted of labourers doing technical work. The skilled labourers were requiredto possess technical degree/diploma qualification.(ii) All the three categories of employees, referred to above, were engaged ascasual labourers. They were being paid very low wages. Their wages were farless than the salary and allowances paid to regular employees, of the Posts andTelegraphs Department, engaged for the same nature of work. The DirectorGeneral, Posts and Telegraphs Department, by an order dated 15.5.1980prescribed the following wages for casual labourers in the Department:-“(i) Casual labour who has not completed 720 days of service in aperiod of three years at the rate of 240 days per annum with theDepartment as on April 1, 1980.No change. They will continue to be paid at the approved localrates.(ii) Casual labour who having been working with the Department fromApril 1, 1977 or earlier and have completed 720 days of service as on April1, 1980.Daily wages equal to 75 per cent of 1/30th of the minimum of GroupD Time Scale plus admissible DA.(iii) Casual labour who has been working in the Department from April 1,1975 or earlier and has completed 1200 days of service as on April 1,1980.Daily wages equal to 1/30th of the minimum of the Group D TimeScale plus 1/30th of the admissible DA.(iv) All the casual labourers will, however, continue to be employed ondaily wages only.(v) These orders for enhanced rates for category (ii) and (iii) above willtake effect from May 1, 1980.(vi) A review will be carried out every year as on the first of April formaking officials eligible for wages indicated in paras (ii) and (iii) above.(vii) The above arrangement of enhanced rates of daily wages will bewithout prejudice to absorption of casual mazdoors against regularvacancies as and when they occur….”Four years later, by an order dated 26.7.1984, the rate of wages payable tocasual labourers in Posts and Telegraphs Department, was revised as under:-
53“(i) Casual semi-skilled/skilled labour who has not completed 720 daysof service over a period of three years or more with the department.No change. They will continue to be paid at the approved localrates.(ii) Casual semi-skilled/skilled labour who has completed 720 days ofservice over a period of three years or more.Daily wage equal to 75 per cent of 1/30th of the minimum of the scaleof semi-skilled (Rs.210-270) or skilled (Rs.260-350) as the case may be,plus admissible DA/ADA thereon.(iii) Casual labour who has completed 1200 days of service over aperiod of 5 years or more.Daily wage equal to 1/30th of the minimum of the pay scale of semiskilled (Rs.210-270) skilled (Rs.260-350) as the case may be, plusDA/ADA admissible thereon.(iv) All the casual semi-skilled/skilled labour will, however continue to beemployed on daily wages only.(v) These orders for enhanced rates for category (ii) and (iii) above willtake effect from April 1, 1984.(vi) A review for making further officials eligible for wages vide (ii) and(iii) above will take effect as on first of April every year.(vii) If the rates calculated vide (ii) and (iii) above happen to be less thanthe approved local rates, payment shall be made as per approved localrates for above categories of labour.(viii) The above arrangements of enhanced rates of daily wages will bewithout prejudice to absorption of casual semi-skilled/skilled labour againstregular vacancies as and when they occur…..”(iii) Aggrieved by the discrimination made against them, through theaforementioned orders dated 15.5.1980 and 26.7.1984, the Mazdoor Manchsubmitted a statement of demands, inter alia, claiming the same salary andallowances and other benefits, as were being paid to regular and permanentemployees of the Union of India, in the corresponding cadres. The aforesaiddemands were departmentally rejected on 13.12.1985. It is, therefore, that thepetitioners approached this Court for the redressal of their grievances.(iv) Before this Court the Union of India contended, that the employees inquestion belonged to the category of casual labourers, and had not been
54regularly employed. As such, it was urged that they were not entitled to thesame privileges, which were extended to regular employees.(v) This Court while adjudicating upon the controversy, took into considerationthe fact that, the employees in question were rendering the same kind of servicewhich was being rendered by regular employees. The submission advancedbefore this Court, on behalf of the casual labourers, was under Article 38(2) ofthe Constitution, which provides that “The State shall, in particular, strive tominimize the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities instatus, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongstgroups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations.” Itwas also urged on behalf of the employees, that the State could not deny (atleast) the minimum pay in the pay-scales of regularly employed workmen, eventhough the Government may not be compelled to extend all the benefits enjoyedby regularly recruited employees.(vi) While adjudicating upon the controversy, this Court expressed the view,that the denial of wages claimed by the workers in question, amounted toexploitation of labour. It was held, that the Government cannot take advantageof its dominant position, and compel any worker to work even as a casuallabourer on starvation wages. It was pointed out, that a casual labourer who hadagreed to work on such low wages, had done so, because he had no otherchoice. In the opinion of this Court, it was poverty, that had driven the workers toaccept such low wages. In the above view of the matter, in the facts andcircumstances of the case, this Court held that classification of employees into
55regularly recruited employees and casual employees for the purpose of payingless than the minimum wage payable to employees in the corresponding regularcadres, particularly in the lowest rung in the department, where the pay-scaleswere the least, was not tenable. This Court also held that the classification oflabourers into three categories (depicted in the orders dated 15.5.1980 and26.7.1984, extracted above) for the purpose of payment of wages at differentrates, was not tenable. It was held, that such a classification was violative ofArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, besides being opposed to the spirit ofArticle 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1966, which exhorts all State parties to ensure fair wages and equal wages forequal work. Accordingly, this Court directed the Union of India, and the otherrespondents, to pay wages to the workmen, who were engaged as casuallabourers, belonging to different categories, at rates equivalent to the minimumpay, in the pay-scales of regularly employed workers, in the correspondingcadres, but without any increments. The workers were also held to be entitled tocorresponding dearness allowance and additional dearness allowance, if any,payable thereon. It was also directed, that whatever other benefits were beingextended to casual labourers hitherto before, would be continued.30. Harbans Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh23, decided by a two-Judgebench: The petitioners in this case were Carpenters (1st and 2nd grade),employed at the Wood Working Centre of the Himachal Pradesh State Handicraft
23 (1989) 4 SCC 459
56Corporation. They were termed as daily-rated employees. Their claim in theirpetition was for emoluments in terms of wages paid to their counterparts inregular Government service, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.On the factual matrix, based on the averments made in the pleadings, this Courtfelt that the Corporation with which the petitioners were employed, had noregularly employed Carpenter. It is, therefore evident, that the claim of thepetitioners was only with reference to Carpenters engaged in differentGovernment services. In the instant factual backdrop, this Court expressed theview, that the claim made by the petitioners could not be accepted, because thediscrimination complained of, must be within the same establishment, owned bythe same management. It was emphasized, that a comparison under theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’ could not be made with counterparts inother establishments, having a different management, or even withestablishments in different geographical locations, though owned by the samemaster. It was held, that unless it was shown, that there was discriminationamongst the same set of employees under the same master, in the sameestablishment, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not be applicable.It is, therefore, that the claim of the petitioners was rejected.31. Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union v. Union of India6, decided by a twoJudge bench: The workers’ union had approached this Court, for the first time, in1984, by filing writ petition no. 13924 of 1984. In the above petition, the reliefclaimed was for payment of wages under the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’. The petitioners sought parity with employees of the New Delhi Municipal
57Committee, and also, with employees of other departments of the DelhiAdministration, and the Union of India. They approached this Court again byfiling civil writ petition no. 869 of 1988, which was disposed of by the above citedcase.(ii) The petitioners were employees of Grih Kalyan Kendras. They desired theUnion of India, to pay them wages in the regular pay-scales, at par with otheremployees performing similar work, under the New Delhi Municipal Committee,or the Delhi Administration, or the Union of India. It would be relevant tomention, that the petitioner- Workers’ Union, was representing employeesworking on ad-hoc basis. Some of them were being paid a fixed salary(described as honorarium), while others were working on piece-rate wages at theproduction centres, without there being any provision for any scale of pay, orother benefits like gratuity, pension, provident fund etc.(iii) This Court, in the first instance, endeavoured to deal with the question,whether employers of these workers, were denying them wages as were beingpaid to other similarly placed employees, doing the same or similar work. Thequestion came to be examined on account of the fact, that unless the petitionerscould demonstrate, that the employees of the Grih Kalyan Kendras were beingdiscriminated against, on the subject of pay and other emoluments, with othersimilarly placed employees, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would notbe applicable. During the course of the first adjudication, in writ petition no.13924 of 1984, this Court requested a former Chief Justice of India to makerecommendations after taking into consideration, firstly, whether other similarly
58situated employees (engaged in similar comparable works, putting in comparablehours of work, in a comparable employment) were being paid higher pay, and ifso, what should be the entitlement of the agitating employees, in order to complywith the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’; and secondly, if there is no othersimilar comparable employment, whether the remuneration of the agitatingemployees deserved to be revised, on the ground that their remuneration wasunconscionable or unfair, and if so, to what extent. Pursuant to the aboverequest, the former Chief Justice of India, concluded, that there was noemployment comparable to the employment held by those engaged by the GrihKalyan Kendras, and therefore, they could not seek parity with employees,working either under the New Delhi Municipal Committee, or the DelhiAdministration, or the Union of India.(iv) Based on the aforesaid factual conclusion, this Court held, that the conceptof equality implies and requires equal treatment, for those who are situatedequally. Comparison between unequals is not possible. Since the workers whohad approached this Court had failed to establish, that they were situatedsimilarly as others, they could not be extended benefits which were being givento those, with whom they claimed parity. And therefore, since there were noother employees comparable to the employees working in the Grih KalyanKendras, this Court declined to entertain the prayer made by the petitioners.
5932. Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary24, decided by atwo-Judge bench: The respondents in this case were engaged by the GhaziabadDevelopment Authority, on daily-wage basis. The instant judgment has beenreferred to only because it was cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Inthe cited case, the claim raised by the respondents was not based on theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’, yet it would be relevant to mention, thatwhile disposing of the appeal preferred by the Ghaziabad Development Authority,this Court held that the respondents, who were engaged as temporary dailywage employees, would not be entitled to pay at par with regular employees, butwould be entitled to pay in the minimum wages prescribed under the statute, ifany, or the prevailing wages as available in the locality. It would, therefore, beimproper for us to treat this judgment as laying down any principle emerging fromthe concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’.33. State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25, decided by a two-Judge bench: Therespondents were employed as Mali-cum-Chowkidars/Pump Operators on dailywage basis, under the employment of the Government of Haryana. They hadapproached the High Court claiming the same salary as was being paid to theregularly employed persons, holding similar posts in the State of Haryana. Theinstant prayer was made by the respondents, under the principle of ‘equal pay forequal work’. The above prayer made by the respondents, was granted by theHigh Court. The High Court issued a direction to the State Government, to pay
24 (1995) 5 SCC 210
25 (1996) 11 SCC 77
60the respondents, the same salary and allowances as were being paid to regularemployees holding similar posts, with effect from the dates on which therespondents were engaged by the State Government.(ii) This Court held, that the respondents who were employed on daily-wagebasis, could not be treated at par with persons employed on regular basis,against similar posts. It was concluded, that daily-rated workers were notrequired to possess the qualifications required for regular workers, nor did theyhave to fulfill the postulated requirement of age, at the time of recruitment. Dailyrated workers, it was felt, were not selected in the same manner as regularemployees, inasmuch as, their selection was not as rigorous as that ofemployees selected on regular basis. This Court expressed the view, that therewere also other provisions relating to regular service, such as the liability of amember of the service to be transferred, and his being subjected to disciplinaryjurisdiction. It was pointed out, that daily-rated employees were not subjected toeither of the aforesaid contingencies/consequences. In view of the aforesaidconsideration, this Court held that the respondents, who were employed on dailywage basis, could not be equated with regular employees for purposes of theirwages, nor were they entitled to obtain the minimum of the regular pay-scaleextended to regular employees. This Court, however held, that if a minimumwage was prescribed for such workers, the respondents would be entitled to it, ifit was higher than the emoluments which were being paid to them.(iii) It would be relevant to mention that in the above decision this Court tooknotice of the fact, that the State of Haryana had taken policy decisions from time
61to time to regularize the services of the employees, similarly placed as therespondents, wherein daily-wage employees on completion of 3/5 years’ service,were entitled to regularization. On their being regularized, they were entitled towages payable to regular employees.34. State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh26, decided by a two-Judge bench: Therespondents were daily-wage Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks engaged by theState of Punjab. They approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court, claimingsalary and allowances, as were being paid to regular employees holding similarposts. The High Court held in their favour, and directed the State Government topay to the respondents, salary and allowances, as were being paid to regularemployees holding similar posts. The aforesaid decision was rendered becausethe High Court accepted their contention, that they were doing the same work aswas taken from regular Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks. Their prayer wasaccordingly accepted, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.(ii) This Court was of the view that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’could enure to the benefit of the respondents to the limited extent, that they couldhave been paid the minimum of the pay-scale of Ledger-Keepers/Ledger Clerks,appointed on regular basis. This conclusion was drawn by applying the principleof ‘equal pay for equal work’. This Court, therefore, allowed the prayer made bythe State Government to the aforesaid limited extent. The right claimed by the
26 (1998) 9 SCC 595
62respondents, to be paid in the same time scale, as regularly employed LedgerKeepers/Ledger Clerks were being paid, was declined.35. State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj27, decided by a two-Judge bench: Thirty fiverespondents were appointed at different points of time, as Helpers on dailywages by the Haryana Roadways. They filed a writ petition before the Punjaband Haryana High Court, claiming regularization because they had rendered longyears of service. They also claimed salary, as was payable to regularemployees, engaged for the same nature of work, as was being performed bythem. Even though, the High Court did not accept the prayer made by therespondents, either for regularization or for payment of wages at par with regularemployees, it directed the State of Haryana to pay to the respondents, theminimum pay in the scale of pay applicable to regular employees. The State ofHaryana being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, approachedthis Court.(ii) While disposing of the appeal preferred by the State of Haryana, this Courtaccepted the contention advanced on its behalf, that a scale of pay is attached toa definite post. This Court also accepted, that a daily-wager holds no post. Inview of the above factual/legal position, this Court arrived at the conclusion, thatthe prayer made by the respondents before the High Court, that they be grantedemoluments in the pay-scale of the regular employees, could not be acceded to.Since no material was placed before the High Court, comparing the nature of
27 (2003) 6 SCC 123
63duties of either category, it was held, that it was not possible to hold that theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’ could be invoked by the respondents, toclaim wages in the regular pay-scale.(iii) Despite having found that the respondents were not eligible to claim wagesin the regular scale of pay, on account of the fact that they were engaged ondaily-wage basis, this Court directed the State of Haryana to pay to therespondents, the minimum wages as prescribed for such workers.36. Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi28, decided by a five-JudgeConstitution Bench: Needless to mention, that the main proposition canvassed inthe instant judgment, pertained to regularization of government servants, basedon the employees having rendered long years of service, as temporary,contractual, casual, daily-wage or on ad-hoc basis. It is, however relevant tomention, that the Constitution Bench did examine the question of wages, whichsuch employees were entitled to draw. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, areference was made to civil appeal nos. 3595-612 of 1999, wherein, therespondent-employees were temporarily engaged on daily-wages in theCommercial Taxes Department. As they had rendered service for more than 10years, they claimed permanent employment in the department. They alsoclaimed benefits as were extended to regular employees of their cadre, includingwages (equal to their salary and allowances) with effect from the dates fromwhich they were appointed. Even though the administrative tribunal had rejected
28 (2006) 4 SCC 1
64their claim, by returning a finding, that they had not made out a case for paymentof wages, equal to those engaged on regular basis, the High Court held that theywere entitled to wages, equal to the salary of regular employees of their cadre,with effect from the date from which they were appointed. The direction issuedby the High Court resulted in payment of higher wages retrospectively, for aperiod of 10 and more years. It would also be relevant to mention, that inpassing the above direction, the High Court had relied on the decision renderedby a three-Judge bench of this Court in Dharwad District PWD Literate DailyWage Employees Association v. State of Karnataka29. The Constitution Bench,having noticed the contentions of the rival parties, on the subject of wagespayable to daily-wagers, recorded its conclusions as under:-“55. In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department, theHigh Court has directed that those engaged on daily wages, be paidwages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to theregular employees of their cadre in government service, with effect fromthe dates from which they were respectively appointed. The objectiontaken was to the direction for payment from the dates of engagement. Wefind that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that theseemployees be paid salary equal to the salary and allowances that arebeing paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service,with effect from the dates from which they were respectively engaged orappointed. It was not open to the High Court to impose such an obligationon the State when the very question before the High Court in the case waswhether these employees were entitled to have equal pay for equal workso called and were entitled to any other benefit. They had also beenengaged in the teeth of directions not to do so. We are, therefore, of theview that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should havedirected that wages equal to the salary that is being paid to regularemployees be paid to these daily-wage employees with effect from thedate of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Benchis modified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paid wages
29 (1990) 2 SCC 396
65equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in theCommercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of thejudgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are onlydaily-wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances beingpaid to them. In view of our conclusion, that Courts are not expected toissue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we setaside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Governmentto consider their cases for regularization. We also notice that the HighCourt has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularization orit was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. Insuch a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and theappeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctionedposts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediatesteps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But whenregular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in C.A. Nos. 3595-3612and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will beallowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitmentand giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in theDepartment for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of theexercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to dojustice to them.”We have extracted the aforesaid paragraph, so as not to make any inference onour own, but to project the determination rendered by the Constitution Bench, aswas expressed by the Bench. We have no hesitation in concluding, that theConstitution Bench consciously distinguished the issue of pay parity, from theissue of absorption/regularization in service. It was held, that on the issue of payparity, the High Court ought to have directed, that the daily-wage workers be paidwages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of their cadre. The ConstitutionBench expressed the view, that the concept of equality would not be applicableto the issue of absorption/regularization in service. And conversely, on thesubject of pay parity, it was unambiguously held, that daily-wage earners shouldbe paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade (without any allowances).
6637. State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh30, decided by a three-Judge bench: Alarge number of civil appeals were collectively disposed of by a common order.In all these appeals, the respondents were daily-wagers, who were appointed asLedger Clerks, Ledger Keepers, Pump Operators, Mali-cum-Chowkidar, Fitters,Petrol Men, Surveyors, etc. All of them claimed the minimum wages payableunder the pay-scale extended to regular Class-IV employees. The above reliefwas claimed with effect from the date of their initial appointment. It would berelevant to mention, that while the appeals disposed of by the common orderwere pending before this Court, all the respondents were regularized. From thedate of their regularization, they were in any case, being paid salary in the scalesapplicable to regular Class-IV employees. The limited question which came upfor adjudication before this Court in the matters was, whether the directionsissued by the High Court to pay the minimum wage in the scale payable to ClassIV employees to the respondents, from the date of their filing the respectivepetition before the High Court, was required to be interfered with. Whileadjudicating upon the aforesaid issue, this Court made the followingobservations:-“19. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of theview that the authorities in the cases of State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh,(1996) 11 SCC 77, State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (2003) 6 SCC 123,Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003)5 SCC 188, Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347, lay downthe correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" isnot an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law.But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of
30 (2006) 9 SCC 321
67"equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in everycase. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities orcharacteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against thosewho were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have areasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters,merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for thepurposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higherpay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotionalavenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very factthat the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself,in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications aredifferent, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even thoughpersons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Wherepersons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit withdue regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who areevaluated by the competent authority cannot be challenged. Aclassification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies adifference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person assay a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusionthat he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman inregular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different andeven the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just acomparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equalpay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a givenjob. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail maydiffer from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work.There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference.Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluatedand determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writcourt can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equalwork should be required to raise a dispute in this regards. In any event theparty who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessaryaverments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any directioncan be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessaryaverments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of materialplaced before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality andall other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal payfrom the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases,we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that thedoctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining anyrelevant factors.”Having made the above observations, the judgments rendered by the High Courtwere set aside, and the matters were remanded back to the High Court, to
68examine each case in order to determine whether the respondents weredischarging the same duties and responsibilities, as the employees with whomthey claimed parity. In sum and substance therefore, this Court acceded to theproposition that daily-wagers who were rendering the same duties andresponsibilities as regular employees, would be entitled to the minimum wage inthe pay-scale payable to regular employees. It is only because the said factualdetermination had not been rendered by the High Court, the matter wasremanded back, for a fresh adjudication on the above limited issue.38. State of U.P. v. Putti Lal31, decided by a three-Judge bench: The questionwhich arose for adjudication was, whether the respondents who were daily-ratedwage earners in the Forest Department, were entitled to regularization, andshould be paid the minimum of the pay-scale as was payable to a regular worker,holding a corresponding post in the Government. On the above issue, this Courtin the above judgment, recorded the following conclusion:-“5. In several cases this Court applying the principle of equal pay forequal work has held that a daily-wager, if he is discharging the similarduties as those in the regular employment of the Government, should atleast be entitled to receive the minimum of the pay scale though he mightnot be entitled to any increment or any other allowance that is permissibleto his counterpart in the Government. In our opinion that would be thecorrect position and we, therefore, direct that these daily-wagers would beentitled to draw at the minimum of the pay scale being received by theircounterparts in the Government and would not be entitled to any otherallowances or increment so long as they continue as daily-wagers. Thequestion of their regular absorption will obviously be dealt with inaccordance with the statutory rules already referred to.”
31 (2006) 9 SCC 337
69It is therefore apparent, that in the instant judgment, the three-Judge benchextended the benefit of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to personsengaged on daily-wage basis.39. State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32, decided by a two-Judge bench: Therespondents in the above mentioned matter, were appointed in different posts inthe Public Health Department of the State of Punjab. All of them were admittedlyappointed on daily-wage basis. Inter alia, because the respondent-employeeshad put in a number of years of service, they were held by the High Court to beentitled to the benefit of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. In thechallenge raised before this Court, it was concluded as under:-“36. With utmost respect, the principle, as indicated hereinbefore, hasundergone a sea change. We are bound by the decisions of largerBenches. This Court had been insisting on strict pleadings and proof ofvarious factors as indicated heretobefore. Furthermore, the burden ofproof even in that case had wrongly been placed on the State which in factlay on the writ petitioners claiming similar benefits. The factual matrixobtaining in the said case particularly similar qualification,interchangeability of the positions within the regular employees and thecasual employees and other relevant factors which have been noticed byus also had some role to play.”Rather than determining whether or not the respondents were entitled to anybenefit under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, on account of theirsatisfying the conditions stipulated by this Court in different judgments includingthe one in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh30, this Court while disposing of theabove matter, required the State to examine the cases of the respondents byappointing an expert committee, which would determine whether or not the
32 (2009) 9 SCC 514
70parameters laid down in the judgments rendered by this Court, would entitle therespondent-employees to any benefit under the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’. Herein again, the principle in question, was considered as applicable totemporary employees.40. Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation v. Mohd. KhursheedAnwar33, decided by a two-Judge bench: In the instant case, the respondentswere employed on contract basis, on a consolidated monthly salary of Rs.2000/-.Prior to their appointment, they were interviewed by a selection committeealongwith other eligible candidates, and were found to be suitable for the job.Their contractual appointment was continued from time to time. Though theywere employed on contract basis, the fact that two posts of Assistant Engineerand one post of Junior Engineer were vacant at the time of their engagement,was not disputed. The respondents were not given any specific designation.The Allahabad High Court, while accepting the claim filed by the respondents,held that they were entitled to wages in the regular pay-scale of Rs.2200-4000,prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer.(ii) This Court, while adjudicating upon the controversy arrived at theconclusion, that the High Court had granted relief to the respondents on theassumption that two vacant posts of Assistant Engineer were utilized forappointing the respondents. The above impression was found to be ex-faciefallacious, by this Court. This Court was of the view, that the orders of
33 (2010) 7 SCC 739
71appointment issued to the respondents, did not lead to the inference, that theywere appointed against the two vacant posts of Assistant Engineer. Despite theabove, this Court held, that the decision of the appellant Corporation to effecteconomy by depriving the respondents even, the minimum of pay-scale, wastotally arbitrary and unjustified. This Court expressed the view, that the very factthat the respondents were engaged on a consolidated salary of Rs.2000 permonth, while the prescribed pay-scale of the post of Assistant Engineer in theother branches was Rs.2200-4000, and that of Junior Engineer was Rs.1600-2660, was sufficient to infer, that both the respondents were engaged to workagainst the posts of Assistant Engineer. The appellants were directed to payemoluments to the respondents, at the minimum of the pay-scale, prescribed forthe post of Assistant Engineer (as revised from time to time), from the date oftheir appointment, till they continued in the employment of the Corporation.41. Surendra Nath Pandey v. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Bank Ltd.34, decidedby a two-Judge bench: The appellants in the above mentioned case, wereappointed during 1978 to 1981 on daily-wage basis, by the U.P. CooperativeBank Ltd. Upto 30.6.1981, they were paid daily-wages. From 1.7.1981, theywere paid consolidated salary of Rs.368 per month, which was increased toRs.575 per month with effect from 1.4.1982. From 1.7.1983, they were extendedthe benefit of minimum in the pay-scale applicable to regular employees, withallowances, but without yearly increments. Based on regulations framed for
34 (2010) 12 SCC 400
72regularization of ad-hoc appointees in 1985, the appellants were regularized fromdifferent dates in 1985-86, whereafter, they were paid wages in the regular payscale, with all allowances. In 1990, they approached the Allahabad High Court,seeking benefit of regular pay-scale, allowances and other benefits, which wereextended to regular employees, with effect from the date of their originalappointment. Their claim was rejected by the High Court. While adjudicatingupon the appeal preferred by the appellants, this Court held as under:-“9. We are of the view that the real issue is whether persons employedon stopgap or ad hoc basis were entitled to the benefit of pay scales withincrements during the period of service on daily or stopgap or ad hocbasis. Unless the appellants are able to establish that either under thecontract, or applicable rules, or settled principles of service jurisprudence,they are entitled to the benefit of pay scale with increments during theperiod of their stopgap/ad hoc service, it cannot be said that the appellantshave the right to claim the benefit of pay scales with increments.”
The Consideration42. All the judgments noticed in paragraphs 7 to 24 hereinabove, pertain toemployees engaged on regular basis, who were claiming higher wages, underthe principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. The claim raised by such employeeswas premised on the ground, that the duties and responsibilities rendered bythem, were against the same post for which a higher pay-scale was beingallowed, in other Government departments. Or alternatively, their duties andresponsibilities were the same, as of other posts with different designations, butthey were placed in a lower scale. Having been painstakingly taken through theparameters laid down by this Court, wherein the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’ was invoked and considered, it would be just and appropriate, to delineate
73the parameters laid down by this Court. In recording the said parameters, wehave also adverted to some other judgments pertaining to temporary employees(also dealt with, in the instant judgment), wherein also, this Court had theoccasion to express the legal position with reference to the principle of ‘equal payfor equal work’. Our consideration, has led us to the following deductions:-(i) The ‘onus of proof’, of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subjectpost with the reference post, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, lieson the person who claims it. He who approaches the Court has to establish, thatthe subject post occupied by him, requires him to discharge equal work of equalvalue, as the reference post (see – the Orissa University of Agriculture &Technology case10, Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. ManjuMathur15, the Steel Authority of India Limited case16, and the National AluminumCompany Limited case18).(ii) The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in a“different department” vis-a-vis the reference post, does not have any bearing onthe determination of a claim, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.Persons discharging identical duties, cannot be treated differently, in the matterof their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of Government(see – the Randhir Singh case1, and the D.S. Nakara case2).(iii) The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, applies to cases of unequalscales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see – theRandhir Singh case1). For equal pay, the concerned employees with whomequation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally
74equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see – the Federation of AllIndia Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case3, the MewaRam Kanojia case5, the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union case6 and the S.C.Chandra case12).(iv) Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), buthaving dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in differentscales of pay, and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’ (see – the Randhir Singh case1, State of Haryana v. Haryana CivilSecretariat Personal Staff Association9, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case17).Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked, merely because thesubject and reference posts have the same nomenclature.(v) In determining equality of functions and responsibilities, under the principleof ‘equal pay for equal work’, it is necessary to keep in mind, that the duties ofthe two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar.Differentiation of pay-scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility,reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, andtherefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see – theFederation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized)case3 and the State Bank of India case8). The nature of work of the subject postshould be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even thevolume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. Ifthese parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of
75‘equal pay for equal work’ (see - State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia4, and the GrihKalyan Kendra Workers’ Union case6).(vi) For placement in a regular pay-scale, the claimant has to be a regularappointee. The claimant should have been selected, on the basis of a regularprocess of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis, cannotclaim to be placed in the regular pay-scale (see – the Orissa University ofAgriculture & Technology case10).(vii) Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties andresponsibilities, can also be placed in different pay-scales. Such as - ‘selectiongrade’, in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimatefoundation, such as – merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see -State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia4).(viii) If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-a-vis thereference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude, that the duties andresponsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see – theMewa Ram Kanojia case5, and Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy11). In sucha cause, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, cannot be invoked.(ix) The reference post, with which parity is claimed, under the principle of‘equal pay for equal work’, has to be at the same hierarchy in the service, as thesubject post. Pay-scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts inquestion, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties andresponsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior
76post, such as a promotional post (see - Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey7, andthe Hukum Chand Gupta case17).(x) A comparison between the subject post and the reference post, under theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’, cannot be made, where the subject postand the reference post are in different establishments, having a differentmanagement. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographicallocations, though owned by the same master (see – the Harbans Lal case23).Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not beentitled to pay parity (see - Official Liquidator v. Dayanand13).(xi) Different pay-scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even forposts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if theduties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposedto higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’ would not be applicable. And also when, the reference post includes theresponsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see– the State Bank of India case8).(xii) The priority given to different types of posts, under the prevailing policies ofthe Government, can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts underdifferent pay-scales. Herein also, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’would not be applicable (see - State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil SecretariatPersonal Staff Association9).(xiii) The parity in pay, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, cannotbe claimed, merely on the ground, that at an earlier point of time, the subject post
77and the reference post, were placed in the same pay-scale. The principle of‘equal pay for equal work’ is applicable only when it is shown, that theincumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar dutiesand responsibilities (see - State of West Bengal v. West Bengal Minimum WagesInspectors Association14).(xiv) For parity in pay-scales, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’,equation in the nature of duties, is of paramount importance. If the principalnature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is nonteaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of dutiesof one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no suchduties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature ofduties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimalduties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see - UnionTerritory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur15).(xv) There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay-scales, betweenemployees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e., between thosedischarging duties at the headquarters, and others working at theinstitutional/sub-office level (see – the Hukum Chand Gupta case17), when theduties are qualitatively dissimilar.(xvi) The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would not be applicable, wherea differential higher pay-scale is extended to persons discharging the sameduties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating
78stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see – the HukumChand Gupta case17).(xvii) Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of oneorganization, and another set of employees of a different organization, there canbe no question of equation of pay-scales, under the principle of ‘equal pay forequal work’, even if two organizations have a common employer. Likewise, if themanagement and control of two organizations, is with different entities, which areindependent of one another, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would notapply (see – the S.C. Chandra case12, and the National Aluminum CompanyLimited case18).43. We shall now venture to summarize the conclusions recorded by thisCourt, with reference to a claim of pay parity, raised by temporary employees(differently designated as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual,and the like), in the following two paragraphs.44. We shall first outline the conclusions drawn in cases where a claim for payparity, raised at the hands of the concerned temporary employees, was acceptedby this Court, by applying the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, withreference to regular employees:-(i) In the Dhirendra Chamoli case19 this Court examined a claim for pay parityraised by temporary employees, for wages equal to those being disbursed toregular employees. The prayer was accepted. The action of not paying thesame wage, despite the work being the same, was considered as violative of
79Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held, that the action amounted toexploitation – in a welfare state committed to a socialist pattern of society.(ii) In the Surinder Singh case20 this Court held, that the right of equal wagesclaimed by temporary employees emerged, inter alia, from Article 39 of theConstitution. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ was again applied,where the subject employee had been appointed on temporary basis, and thereference employee was borne on the permanent establishment. The temporaryemployee was held entitled to wages drawn by an employee on the regularestablishment. In this judgment, this Court also took note of the fact, that theabove proposition was affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court, in the D.S.Nakara case2.(iii) In the Bhagwan Dass case21 this Court recorded, that in a claim for equalwages, the duration for which an employee would remain (- or had remained)engaged, would not make any difference. So also, the manner of selection andappointment would make no difference. And therefore, whether the selectionwas made on the basis of open competition or was limited to a cluster of villages,was considered inconsequential, insofar as the applicability of the principle isconcerned. And likewise, whether the appointment was for a fixed limitedduration (six months, or one year), or for an unlimited duration, was alsoconsidered inconsequential, insofar as the applicability of the principle of ‘equalpay for equal work’ is concerned. It was held, that the claim for equal wageswould be sustainable, where an employee is required to discharge similar dutiesand responsibilities as regular employees, and the concerned employee
80possesses the qualifications prescribed for the post. In the above case, thisCourt rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the Government, that theplea of equal wages by the employees in question, was not sustainable becausethe concerned employees were engaged in a temporary scheme, and againstposts which were sanctioned on a year to year basis.(iv) In the Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&T Departmentthrough Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch case22 this Court held, that underprinciple flowing from Article 38(2) of the Constitution, Government could notdeny a temporary employee, at least the minimum wage being paid to anemployee in the corresponding regular cadre, alongwith dearness allowance andadditional dearness allowance, as well as, all the other benefits which were beingextended to casual workers. It was also held, that the classification of workers(as unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled), doing the same work, into differentcategories, for payment of wages at different rates, was not tenable. It was alsoheld, that such an act of an employer, would amount to exploitation. And furtherthat, the same would be arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore, violative ofArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.(v) In State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh26 this Court held, that daily-wagerswere entitled to be placed in the minimum of the pay-scale of regular employees,working against the same post. The above direction was issued after accepting,that the concerned employees, were doing the same work as regular incumbentsholding the same post, by applying the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
81(vi) In the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28, a Constitution Bench of thisCourt, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and directed that daily-wagersbe paid salary equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowances being paid toregular employees. Importantly, in this case, this Court made a very importantdistinction between pay parity and regularization. It was held that the concept ofequality would not be applicable to issues of absorption/regularization. But, theconcept was held as applicable, and was indeed applied, to the issue of payparity – if the work component was the same. The judgment rendered by theHigh Court, was modified by this Court, and the concerned daily-wageemployees were directed to be paid wages, equal to the salary at the lowestgrade of the concerned cadre.(vii) In State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh30, a three-Judge bench of this Courtheld, that the decisions rendered by this Court in State of Haryana v. JasmerSingh25, State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj27, the Orissa University of Agriculture &Technology case10, and Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy11, laid down thecorrect law. Thereupon, this Court declared, that if the concerned daily-wageemployees could establish, that they were performing equal work of equalquality, and all other relevant factors were fulfilled, a direction by a Court to paysuch employees equal wages (from the date of filing the writ petition), would bejustified.(viii) In State of U.P. v. Putti Lal31, based on decisions in several cases (whereinthe principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ had been invoked), it was held, that adaily-wager discharging similar duties, as those engaged on regular basis, would
82be entitled to draw his wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (drawn by hiscounterpart, appointed on regular basis), but would not be entitled to any otherallowances or increments.(ix) In the Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation case33 this Courtnoticed, that the respondents were employed on contract basis, on aconsolidated salary. But, because they were actually appointed to perform thework of the post of Assistant Engineer, this Court directed the employer to paythe respondents wages, in the minimum of the pay-scales ascribed for the post ofAssistant Engineer.45. We shall now attempt an analysis of the judgments, wherein this Courtdeclined to grant the benefit of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to temporaryemployees, in a claim for pay parity with regular employees:-(i) In the Harbans Lal case23, daily-rate employees were denied the claimedbenefit, under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, because they could notestablish, that the duties and responsibilities of the post(s) held by them, weresimilar/equivalent to those of the reference posts, under the State Government.(ii) In the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union case6, ad-hoc employeesengaged in the Kendras, were denied pay parity with regular employees workingunder the New Delhi Municipal Committee, or the Delhi Administration, or theUnion of India, because of the finding returned in the report submitted by aformer Chief Justice of India, that duties and responsibilities discharged byemployees holding the reference posts, were not comparable with the posts heldby members of the petitioner union.
83(iii) In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj27, this Court took a slightly different course,while determining a claim for pay parity, raised by daily-wagers (- therespondents). It was concluded, that daily-wagers held no post, and as such,could not be equated with regular employees who held regular posts. But hereinalso, no material was placed on record, to establish that the nature of dutiesperformed by the daily-wagers, was comparable with those discharged by regularemployees. Be that as it may, it was directed, that the State should prescribeminimum wages for such workers, and they should be paid accordingly.(iv) In State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32, this Court held, that for the applicabilityof the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, the respondents who were dailywagers, had to establish through strict pleadings and proof, that they weredischarging similar duties and responsibilities, as were assigned to regularemployees. Since they had not done so, the matter was remanded back to theHigh Court, for a re-determination on the above position. It is therefore obvious,that this Court had accepted, that where duties, responsibilities and functionswere shown to be similar, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would beapplicable, even to temporary employees (otherwise the order of remand, wouldbe meaningless, and an exercise in futility).(vi) It is, therefore apparent, that in all matters where this Court did not extendthe benefit of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to temporary employees, it was becausethe employees could not establish, that they were rendering similar duties andresponsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holdingcorresponding posts.
8446. We have consciously not referred to the judgment rendered by this Courtin State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25 (by a two-Judge division bench), in thepreceding two paragraphs. We are of the considered view, that the abovejudgment, needs to be examined and explained independently. Learned counselrepresenting the State government, had placed emphatic reliance on thisjudgment. Our analysis is recorded hereinafter:-(i) In the above case, the respondents who were daily-wagers were claimingthe same salary as was being paid to regular employees. A series of reasonswere recorded, to deny them pay parity under the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’. This Court expressed the view, that daily-wagers could not be treated atpar with persons employed on regular basis, because they were not required topossess qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Dailywagers, it was felt, were not selected in the same manner as regular employees,inasmuch as, a regular appointee had to compete in a process of open selection,and would be appointed, only if he fell within the zone of merit. It was also felt,that daily-wagers were not required to fulfill the prescribed requirement of age, atthe time of their recruitment. And also because, regular employees were subjectto disciplinary proceedings, whereas, daily-wagers were not. Daily-wagers, itwas held, could also not be equated with regular employees, because regularemployees were liable to be transferred anywhere within their cadre. This Courttherefore held, that those employed on daily-wages, could not be equated withregular employees, and as such, were not entitled to pay parity, under theprinciple of ‘equal pay for equal work’.
85(ii) First and foremost, it is necessary to emphasise, that in the course of itsconsideration in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25, this Court’s attention hadnot been invited to the judgment in the Bhagwan Dass case21, wherein on someof the factors noticed above, a contrary view was expressed. In the said case,this Court had held, that in a claim for equal wages, the manner of selection forappointment would not make any difference. It will be relevant to notice, that forthe posts under reference in the Bhagwan Dass case21, the selection of thoseappointed on regular basis, had to be made through the Subordinate SelectionBoard, by way of open selection. Whereas, the selection of the petitioners asdaily-wagers, was limited to candidates belonging to a cluster of villages, andwas not through any specialized selection body/agency. Despite thereof, it washeld, that the benefit under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, could notbe denied to the petitioners. The aforesaid conclusion was drawn on the ground,that as long as the petitioners were performing similar duties, as those engagedon regular basis (on corresponding posts) from the standpoint of the doctrine of‘equal pay for equal work’, there could be no distinction on the subject ofpayment of wages.(iii) Having noticed the conclusion drawn in State of Haryana v. JasmerSingh25, it would be relevant to emphasise, that in the cited judgments (noticed inparagraph 26 onwards, upto paragraph 41), the employees concerned, could nothave been granted the benefit of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ (insuch of the cases, where it was so granted), because temporary employees(daily-wage employees, in the said case) are never ever selected through a
86process of open selection, by a specialized selection body/agency. We wouldtherefore be obliged to follow the large number of cases where pay parity wasgranted, rather than, the instant singular judgment recording a divergent view.(iv) Temporary employees (irrespective of their nomenclature) are also nevergoverned by any rules of disciplinary action. As a matter of fact, a daily-wager isengaged only for a day, and his services can be dispensed with at the end of theday for which he is engaged. Rules of disciplinary action, are therefore to theadvantage of regular employees, and the absence of their applicability, is to thedisadvantage of temporary employees, even though the judgment in State ofHaryana v. Jasmer Singh25, seems to project otherwise.(v) Even the issue of transferability of regular employees referred to in State ofHaryana v. Jasmer Singh25, in our view, has not been examined closely.Inasmuch as, temporary employees can be directed to work anywhere, within oroutside their cadre, and they have no choice but to accept. This is again, afurther disadvantage suffered by temporary employees, yet the judgment projectsas if it is to their advantage.(vi) It is also necessary to appreciate, that in all temporary appointments (-work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like), thedistinguishing features referred to in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25, areinevitable, yet in all the judgments referred to above (rendered before and after,the judgment in the State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25), the propositionrecorded in the instant judgment, was never endorsed.
87(vii) It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees do notpossess the minimum qualifications required to be possessed for regularappointment. And therefore, this proposition would not be applicable to the factsof the cases in hand.(viii) Another reason for us in passing by, the judgment in State of Haryana v.Jasmer Singh25 is, that the bench deciding the matter had in mind, that dailywagers in the State of Haryana, were entitled to regularization on completion of3/5 years of service, and therefore, all the concerned employees, would in anycase be entitled to wages in the regular pay-scale, after a little while. This factualposition was noticed in the judgment itself.(ix) It is not necessary for us to refer the matter for adjudication to a largerbench, because the judgment in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh25, isirreconcilable and inconsistent with a large number of judgments, some of whichare by larger benches, where the benefit of the principle in question wasextended to temporary employees (including daily-wagers).(x) For all the above reasons, we are of the view that the claim of theappellants cannot be considered, on the basis of the judgment in State ofHaryana v. Jasmer Singh25.47. We shall now endeavour to examine the impugned judgments.48. First and foremost, it is essential for us to deal with the judgment dated11.11.2011 rendered by the full bench of the High Court (in Avtar Singh v. Stateof Punjab & Ors., CWP no. 14796 of 2003). A perusal of the above judgmentreveals, that the High Court conspicuously focused its attention to the decision of
88the Constitution Bench in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28. Whiledealing with the above judgment, the full bench expressed the view, that thoughat the first impression, the judgment appeared to expound that payment ofminimum wages drawn by regular employees, had also to be extended topersons employed on temporary basis, but a careful reading of the same wouldshow that, that was not so. Learned counsel, representing the State of Punjab,reiterated the above position. In order to understand the tenor of the aforesaidassertion, reference was made to paragraphs 44 and 48, of the judgment of theConstitution Bench, which are extracted hereunder:-“44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work’’ is different from theconcept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed onad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection asenvisaged by the rules. This Court has in various decisions applied theprinciple of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters forthe application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the conceptof equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directiveprinciples in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot leadto a position where the court could direct that appointments made withoutfollowing the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent orissue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negationof the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order asis necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pendingbefore this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to theprocedure established by law in the matter of public employment….…..It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdictionunder Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power underArticle 142 of the Constitution permitting those persons engaged, to beabsorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments orengagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law andthough it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court wouldnot grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.xxx xxx xxx48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thusappointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It isstated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing themon less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a prettylong period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting
89more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before uswere engaged on daily wages in the department concerned on a wage thatwas made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed uponwas not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a classby themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as againstthose who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules.No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim thatsuch employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruitedcandidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that theprinciple could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. Thereis no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wagesor temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to beabsorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said tobe holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only bymaking appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the otheremployees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim forequal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would betreating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right tobe absorbed in service even though they have never been selected interms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.”We have given our thoughtful consideration to the observations recorded by thisCourt, as were relied upon by the full bench (- as also, by the learned counselrepresenting the State of Punjab). It is not possible for us to concur with theinference drawn by the full bench, for the reasons recorded hereunder:-(i) We are of the considered view, that in paragraph 44 extracted above, theConstitution Bench clearly distinguished the issues of pay parity, andregularization in service. It was held, that on the issue of pay parity, the conceptof ‘equality’ would be applicable (as had indeed been applied by the Court, invarious decisions), but the principle of ‘equality’ could not be invoked forabsorbing temporary employees in Government service, or for making temporaryemployees regular/permanent. All the observations made in the above extractedparagraphs, relate to the subject of regularization/permanence, and not, to the
90principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. As we have already noticed above, theConstitution Bench unambiguously held, that on the issue of pay parity, the HighCourt ought to have directed, that the daily-wage workers be paid wages equal tothe salary, at the lowest grade of their cadre. This deficiency was made good, bymaking such a direction.(ii) Insofar as paragraph 48 extracted above is concerned, all that needs to bestated is, that they were merely submissions of learned counsel, and notconclusions drawn by this Court. Therefore, nothing further needs to be stated,with reference to paragraph 48.(iii) We are therefore of the view, that the High Court seriously erred ininterpreting the judgment rendered by this Court in the Secretary, State ofKarnataka case28, by placing reliance on paragraphs 44 and 48 extracted above,for drawing its inferences with reference to the subject of pay parity. On theabove subject/issue, this Court’s conclusions were recorded in paragraph 55(extracted in paragraph 36, hereinabove), which have already been dealt with byus in an earlier part of this judgment.49. It would also be relevant to mention, that to substantiate its inferencedrawn from the judgment rendered by this Court in the Secretary, State ofKarnataka case28, the full bench of the High Court, placed reliance on State ofPunjab v. Surjit Singh32, and while doing so, reference was made to the followingobservations recorded in paragraphs 27 to 30 (of the said judgment). Learnedcounsel for the State of Punjab has reiterated the above position. Paragraphs 27to 30 aforementioned are being extracted hereunder:-
91“27. While laying down the law that regularization under the constitutionalscheme is wholly impermissible, the Court in State of Karnataka v.Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, had issued certain directions relating to theemployees in the services of the Commercial Taxes Department, asnoticed hereinbefore. The employees of the Commercial TaxesDepartment were in service for more than ten years. They were appointedin 1985-1986. They were sought to be regularized in terms of a scheme.Recommendations were made by the Director, Commercial Taxes for theirabsorption. It was only when such recommendations were not acceded to,the Administrative Tribunal was approached. It rejected their claim. TheHigh Court, however, allowed their prayer which was in question beforethis Court.28. This Court stated: (Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006)4 SCC 1, pp. 19-20, para 8)"8. … It is seen that the High Court without really coming to gripswith the question falling for decision in the light of the findings of theAdministrative Tribunal and the decisions of this Court, proceeded toorder that they are entitled to wages equal to the salary andallowances that are being paid to the regular employees of theircadre in government service with effect from the dates from whichthey were respectively appointed. It may be noted that this gaveretrospective effect to the judgment of the High Court by more than12 years. The High Court also issued a command to the State toconsider their cases for regularisation within a period of four monthsfrom the date of receipt of that order. The High Court seems to haveproceeded on the basis that, whether they were appointed before1-7-1984, a situation covered by the decision of this Courtin Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. v.State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396, and the scheme framedpursuant to the direction thereunder, or subsequently, since theyhave worked for a period of 10 years, they were entitled to equal payfor equal work from the very inception of their engagement on dailywages and were also entitled to be considered for regularisation intheir posts."29. It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop, this Court in exercise ofits jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed:(Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, p. 43, para55)"55. … Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench ismodified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paidwages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of theircadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service,from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the HighCourt. Since, they are only daily-wage earners, there would be noquestion of other allowances being paid to them. In view of ourconclusion, that the courts are not expected to issue directions for
92making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part ofthe direction of the High Court directing the Government to considertheir cases for regularisation. We also notice that the High Court hasnot adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularisation or itwas giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. Insuch a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted andthe appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. Ifsanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the Statewill take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular processof selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, therespondents in CAs Nos. 3595-612 and those in the CommercialTaxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete,waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and givingsome weightage for their having been engaged for work in theDepartment for a significant period of time. That would be the extentof the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of theConstitution to do justice to them."30. We, therefore, do not see that any law has been laid down in para55 of the judgment in Umadevi case. Directions were issued in view of thelimited controversy. As indicated, the State’s grievances were limited.”Yet again, we are of the view, that the full bench erred in referring to the aboveobservations, to draw its conclusions. Our reasons are summarizedhereinbelow:-(i) It is apparent, that this Court in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32, did hold,that the determination rendered in paragraph 55 of the judgment in the Secretary,State of Karnataka case28, was in exercise of the power vested in this Court,under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. But the above observation doesnot lead, to the conclusion or the inference, that the principle of ‘equal pay forequal work’ is not applicable to temporary employees. In fact, there is a positivetake-away for the temporary employees. The Constitution Bench would, in theabove situation, be deemed to have concluded, that to do complete justice to thecause of temporary employees, they should be paid the minimum wage of aregular employee, discharging the same duties. It needs to be noticed, that on
93the subject of pay parity, the findings recorded by this Court in the Secretary,State of Karnataka case28, were limited to the conclusions recorded in paragraph55 thereof (which we have dealt with above, while dealing with the case law, onthe principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’).(ii) Even in the case under reference - State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32, thisCourt accepted the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, as applicable totemporary employees, by requiring the State to examine the claim of therespondents for pay parity, by appointing an expert committee. The expertcommittee was required to determine, whether the respondents satisfied theconditions stipulated in different judgments of this Court including State of Punjabv. Charanjit Singh30, wherein this Court had acceded to the proposition, thatdaily-wagers who were rendering the same duties and responsibilities as regularemployees, would be entitled to the minimum wage payable to regularemployees. And had therefore, remanded the matter back to the High Court fora fresh adjudication. Paragraph 38 of the judgment in State of Punjab v. SurjitSingh32, wherein the remand was directed, is being extracted below:-“38. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would besubserved if the State is directed to examine the cases of the respondentsherein by appointing an expert committee as to whether the principles oflaw laid down herein viz. as to whether the respondents satisfy the factorsfor invocation of the decision in State of Haryana v. Charajnit Singh, (2006)9 SCC 321 in its entirety including the question of appointment in terms ofthe recruitment rules have been followed.”(iii) For all the above reasons, we are of the view, that the claim of thetemporary employees, for minimum wages, at par with regularly engaged
94Government employees, cannot be declined, on the basis of the judgment inState of Punjab v. Surjit Singh32.50. The impugned judgment rendered by the full bench, also relied upon thejudgment in Satya Prakash v. State of Bihar35, which also attempted to interpretthe judgment in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28. Learned counsel forthe State of Punjab also referred to the same, to canvass the case of the Stategovernment. Relevant observations relied upon, are reproduced below:-“7. We are of the view that the appellants are not entitled to get thebenefit of regularization of their services since they were never appointedin any sanctioned posts. The appellants were only engaged on daily wagesin the Bihar Intermediate Education Council.8. In State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, this Courtheld that the Courts are not expected to issue any direction forabsorption/regularization or permanent continuance of temporary,contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees. This Court heldthat such directions issued could not be said to be inconsistent with theconstitutional scheme of public employment. This Court held that merelybecause a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for atime beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to beabsorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength ofsuch continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following adue process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. In view of thelaw laid down by this Court, the directions sought for by the appellantscannot be granted.9. Paragraph 53 of Umadevi (3) judgment, deals with irregularappointments (not illegal appointments). The Constitution Benchspecifically referred to the judgments in State of Mysore vs. S.V.Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071, and R.N. Nanjundappa vs. T.Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409, in para 15 of Umadevi (3) judgment as well.Let us refer to paras 15 and 16 of Umadevi (3) judgment in this context.xxx xxx xxx15. In our view, the appellants herein would fall under the category ofpersons mentioned in paras 8 and 55 of the judgment and not in para 53 ofjudgment of Umadevi (3).”
35 (2010) 4 SCC 179
95Yet again, all that needs to be stated is, that the observations relied upon by thefull bench of the High Court, dealt with the issue of regularization, and not withthe concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’. Paragraph 7 extracted above, leavesno room for any doubt, that the issue being considered in the Satya Prakashcase35, pertained to regularization of the appellants in service. Our view, that theissue being dealt with pertained to regularization gains further ground from thefact (recorded in paragraph 1 of the above judgment), that the appellants in theSatya Prakash case35 had approached this Court, to claim the benefit ofparagraph 53 of the judgment in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28.Paragraph 53 aforementioned, is reproduced below:-“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be caseswhere irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained inState of Maysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071, R.N.Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409, and B.N. Nagarajan v.State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507, and referred to in para 15 above, ofduly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have beenmade and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more butwithout the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The questionof regularisation of the services of such employees may have to beconsidered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court inthe cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context,the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalitiesshould take steps to regularize as a one-time measure, the services ofsuch irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunalsand should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fillthose vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases wheretemporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. Theprocess must be set in motion within six months from this date. We alsoclarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need notbe reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no furtherbypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or makingpermanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.”
96A perusal of paragraph 53 extracted above, leaves no room for any doubt, thatthe issue canvassed was of regularization, and not pay parity. We are thereforeof the view, that reliance on paragraph 53, for determining the question of payparity (claimed by the concerned employees), resulted in the High Court drawingan incorrect inference.51. The full bench of the High Court, while adjudicating upon the abovecontroversy had concluded, that temporary employees were not entitled to theminimum of the regular pay-scale, merely for the reason, that the activitiescarried on by daily-wagers and regular employees were similar. The full benchhowever, made two exceptions. Temporary employees, who fell in either of thetwo exceptions, were held entitled to wages at the minimum of the pay-scaledrawn by regular employees. The exceptions recorded by the full bench of theHigh Court in the impugned judgment are extracted hereunder:-“(1) A daily wager, ad hoc or contractual appointee against the regularsanctioned posts, if appointed after undergoing a selection process basedupon fairness and equality of opportunity to all other eligible candidates,shall be entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale from the date ofengagement.(2) But if daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees are notappointed against regular sanctioned posts and their services are availedcontinuously, with notional breaks, by the State Government or itsinstrumentalities for a sufficient long period i.e. for 10 years, such dailywagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees shall be entitled to minimum ofthe regular pay scale without any allowances on the assumption that workof perennial nature is available and having worked for such long period oftime, an equitable right is created in such category of persons. Their claimfor regularization, if any, may have to be considered separately in terms oflegally permissible scheme.(3) In the event, a claim is made for minimum pay scale after more thanthree years and two months of completion of 10 years of continuousworking, a daily wager, ad hoc or contractual employee shall be entitled toarrears for a period of three years and two months.”
97A perusal of the above conclusion drawn in the impugned judgment (passed bythe full bench), reveals that the full bench carved an exception for employeeswho were not appointed against regular sanctioned posts, if their services hadremained continuous (with notional breaks, as well), for a period of 10 years.This category of temporary employees, was extended the benefit of wages at theminimum of the regular pay-scale. In the Secretary, State of Karnataka case28,similarly, employees who had rendered 10 years service, were granted anexception (refer to paragraph 53 of the judgment, extracted in the precedingparagraph). The above position adopted by the High Court reveals, that the HighCourt intermingled the legal position determined by this Court on the subject ofregularization of employees, while adjudicating upon the proposition of payparity, emerging under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. In our view, itis this mix-up, which has resulted in the High Court recording its afore-extractedconclusions.(ii) The High Court extended different wages to temporary employees, bycategorizing them on the basis of their length of service. This is clearly in theteeth of judgment in the Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P&TDepartment through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch case22. In the abovejudgment, this Court held, that classification of employees based on their lengthof service (- those who had not completed 720 days of service, in a period of 3years; those who had completed more than 720 days of service - with effect from1.4.1977; and those who had completed 1200 days of service), for payment ofdifferent levels of wages (even though they were admittedly discharging the
98same duties), was not tenable. The classification was held to be violative ofArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.(iii) Based on the consideration recorded hereinabove, the determination in theimpugned judgment rendered by the full bench of the High Court, whereby itclassified temporary employees for differential treatment on the subject of wages,is clearly unsustainable, and is liable to be set aside.52. In view of all our above conclusions, the decision rendered by the fullbench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no.14796 of 2003), dated 11.11.2011, is liable to be set aside, and the same ishereby set aside. The decision rendered by the division bench of the High Courtin State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (LPA no. 337 of 2003, decidedon 7.1.2009) is also liable to be set aside, and the same is also hereby set aside.We affirm the decision rendered in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar(LPA no. 1024 of 2009, decided on 30.8.2010), with the modification, that theconcerned employees would be entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale, of thecategory to which they belong, but would not be entitled to allowances attachedto the posts held by them.53. We shall now deal with the claim of temporary employees before thisCourt.54. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’ has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of theConstitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number ofjudgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court.
99The same is binding on all the courts in India, under Article 141 of theConstitution of India. The parameters of the principle, have been summarized byus in paragraph 42 hereinabove. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ hasalso been extended to temporary employees (differently described as workcharge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position,relating to temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, isbeing reiterated by us, yet again.55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters todeny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paidless than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainlynot, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at thevery foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesserwage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to hisfamily, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, andat the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would sufferimmensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying lesswages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitativeenslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action isoppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation.56. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The same is reproduced below:-
100“Article 7The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyoneto the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, inparticular:(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal valuewithout distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteedconditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equalpay for equal work;(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordancewith the provisions of the present Covenant;(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment toan appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than thoseof seniority and competence;(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodicholidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.”India is a signatory to the above covenant, having ratified the same on10.4.1979. There is no escape from the above obligation, in view of differentprovisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in view of the law declaredby this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principle of ‘equalpay for equal work’ constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested inevery employee – whether engaged on regular or temporary basis.57. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application ofthe principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in relation to temporary employees(daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casualbasis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires ourdetermination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), wererendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regularemployees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would requirethe application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’
101summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instantaspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factualposition. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counselrepresenting the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the presentbunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in theregular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of theiremployment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputedto discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, wereassigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantiveposts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned totemporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for anydoubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporaryemployees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were beingdischarged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that therespondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed forappointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, thatany of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of theprinciples summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be nodoubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to allthe concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claimwages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engagedGovernment employees, holding the same post.
10258. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, wehave no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in thepresent bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of thepay-scale (- at the lowest grade, in the regular pay-scale), extended to regularemployees, holding the same post.59. Disposed of in the above terms.60. It would be unfair for us, if we do not express our gratitude for theassistance rendered to us by Mr. Rakesh Khanna, Additional Advocate General,Punjab. He researched for us, on our asking, all the judgments on the issue ofpay parity. He presented them to us, irrespective of whether the conclusionsrecorded therein, would or would not favour the cause supported by him. Healso assisted us, on different parameters and outlines, suggested by us, duringthe course of hearing.
…..…………………………….J.
(Jagdish Singh Khehar)
…..…………………………….J.
(S.A. Bobde)New Delhi;October 26, 2016.Note: The emphases supplied in all the quotations in the instant judgment, areours.